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If ye by rules would measure
what doth not with your rules agree;
forgetting all your learning,
seek ye first what its rules may be.1
In one of its last decisions of the 1989 term, the United States Supreme
Court once again addressed a question involving the scope of the Racketeer-
ing Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).2 RICO generally pro-
hibits individuals from engaging in a pattern of criminal conduct involving
an "enterprise." This enterprise may be either a formal legal entity, such as
a corporation, or an informal group of individuals. Originally designed to
combat the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate businesses, RICO
provides for treble damages in private civil actions and for enhanced penal-
ties and forfeitures in criminal cases. Not surprisingly, such provisions have
made RICO the darling of prosecutors and plaintiffs and the bane of crimi-
nal and civil defendants. These diverging interests have led to a number of
challenges to RICO, the most recent being HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co.3
In HJ. Inc., the Supreme Court addressed what types of conduct consti-
tute a "pattern of racketeering" under RICO.' The petitioners, customers of
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., alleged that the company made payments
to the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission to influence rate approvals.'
The petitioners brought their claims under section 1962 of RICO.6 The
* Mr. Kelley is an attorney with Bass, Berry & Sims in Knoxville, Tennessee. The
author would like to express his appreciation to Professor Rainier Kraakman of Harvard Law
School for reviewing drafts of this Article.
1. Hans Sachs in Richard Wagner, DIE MEISTERSINGER, Act I, Scene 3 (trans. Freder-
ick Jameson).
2. Organized Crime and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)).
3. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
4. Id at 233.
5. Id
6. Id
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Court held that these payments amounted to bribes, which constituted
"racketeering activity" under section 1961 of the Act, and remanded the
case on the ground that the petitioners might be able to show a pattern of
racketeering activity by satisfying the relationship and continuity require-
ments of the Act.7
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia stated that the Court's earlier deci-
sion in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.' generated "the widest and most per-
sistent circuit split on an issue of federal law in recent memory." 9 The
significance of Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, which was joined by three
other justices, is its clanging intimation that RICO's pattern requirement
may be unconstitutionally vague.'0
This Article addresses the narrow question of whether the phrase "pattern
of racketeering activity" satisfies the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. Specifically, this Article analyzes whether the statute provides suffi-
cient warning to potential defendants about prohibited conduct, and whether
the statute provides law enforcement officials adequate guidance. Section I
of the Article discusses the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations
Act and its purposes. In Section II, the Article analyzes the different circuit
court interpretations of "pattern," both before and in the wake of H.J Inc.
Section III outlines the void-for-vagueness doctrine, focusing on recent
United States Supreme Court cases which have modified the- doctrine. Sec-
tion IV applies the void-for-vagueness doctrine to RICO's pattern require-
ment and concludes that the phrase "pattern of racketeering activity" is
either facially or partially vague and, therefore, unconstitutional. Section V
attempts to remedy RICO's vagueness by modifying the present statute.
This section suggests that the phrase "pattern of racketeering activity" be
replaced with the phrase "structural racketeering activity," and that the new
7. Id at 234.
8. 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (5-4 decision). In Sedima, the petitioner alleged that the respon-
dent, a joint venture partner, overbilled its expenses, thereby decreasing the proceeds realized
by petitioner. Id. at 483-84. The petitioner filed claims under RICO sections 1962 and 1964.
The Second Circuit dismissed the RICO claims for failure to state a claim. Id. at 484. The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded stating that the petitioner "may maintain this action if
the [respondents] conducted the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity." Id at
500.
9. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 251 (Scalia, J., concurring).
10. Justice Scalia's concurrence states:
No constitutional challenge to this law has been raised in the present case, and so
that issue is not before us. That the highest Court in the land has been unable to
derive from this statute anything more than today's meager guidance bodes ill for the
day when that challenge is presented.




phrase be defined explicitly in the statute. This proposed statute would pass
the void-for-vagueness test without unduly restricting the scope of RICO.
I. THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF RICO
A. The Context of RICO. The Organized Crime Control Act
RICO was part of the comprehensive Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 (OCCA).1" Congress enacted the OCCA to "seek the eradication of
organized crime in the United States." 12 The OCCA's legislative history
indicated a growing public concern with crime, particularly organized
crime. 3 For example, in urging the Senate to cease the debate over the bill's
constitutionality, Senator John L. McClellan (D-Ark.) said:
Again, I insist that the crime situation in America today is such,
and is progressing so rapidly, that it is imperative that this branch
of Government, at least, take every action, enact every law, fashion
every tool it can possibly fashion within the framework of the Con-
stitution, to enable our law enforcement agencies and officials to
combat the growing menace of crime. 4
11. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.). First proposed by Senator McClellan in January of 1969, the original bill, S. 30, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., did not contain the substantive provisions which the final bill, S. 30, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., contained: title VIII (dealing with syndicated gambling), title IX (dealing
with racketeering), or title XI (dealing with the regulation of explosives). After the bill was
amended to add these provisions, S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), the Senate
passed S. 30 in January 1970. The House of Representatives also made certain changes in the
bill, including an amendment added on October 7, 1970 which gave private plaintiffs a civil
cause of action under Title IX. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), 116 CONG.
REc. 35,203-04 (1970). On October 15, 1970, the final version of the Organized Crime Control
Act became law.
12. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923.
Although organized crime was the focus of the Organized Crime Control Act, certain provi-
sions went beyond the context of organized crime. For example, the Dangerous Special Of-
fender section of the OCCA (Title X), which provides enhanced penalties for particular types
of offenders, applies to habitual offenders and to "professional" criminals as well as to racke-
teers. 18 U.S.C. § 3375(e) (1988).
Similarly, RICO's civil provisions allow private plaintiffs to sue defendants who engage in
particular conduct even if the defendants have no link to organized crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1964
(1988); see 116 CONG. REC. 35,204 (1970) (comments by Rep. Poff, discussing difficulty of
defining organized crime "precisely and definitively" and problems of limiting prohibitions to
"a certain type of defendant").
13. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 18,912 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan defending
charges that the OCCA violated civil liberties by emphasizing its role in fighting organized
crime); 116 CONG. REc. 35,205 (1970) (statement of Rep. Mikva, a dissenting member of the
House committee that studied S. 30, noting that "the salutory purposes for which this bill
aimed at organized crime was intended, somehow never c[a]me to fruition").
14. 116 CONG. REc. 25,193 (1970); see also 116 CONG. REC. 35,206-07 (1970). Represen-
tative Clancy noted that "[stronger laws are needed; let us pass them. Let us start enforcing
1991]
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In enacting the OCCA, Congress created such new substantive laws as
RICO, "cur[ed] a number of debilitating defects in the evidence-gathering
process," and developed new penalties and remedies for organized crime. 5
The OCCA established three substantive laws, two of which were desig-
nated to attack organized crime-the Syndicated Gambling provision (title
VIII of the OCCA)16 and RICO (title IX of the OCCA)."7 The Syndicated
Gambling statute was Congress' response to the belief that "syndicated gam-
bling is the mob's principal source of income."' 8 Congress' goal in enacting
RICO was to destroy the financial base of criminal enterprises, thereby sap-
ping their strength and hindering their infiltration into legitimate businesses.
Such infiltration was the principal concern of RICO.19 Title VIII of the
OCCA applies to anyone who "conducts, finances, manages, supervises, di-
rects, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business."'2 The penalties
under title VIII include fines and imprisonment.2 Similar penalties are also
available for those who "conspire to obstruct" a state's criminal laws with
the intent to aid an illegal gambling business.2 2
the ones we have.... Rioters and organized groups who flaunt the law and destroy private
property must be dealt with strongly." Id
15. 116 CONG. REc. 18,912 (1970). Senator McClellan said that amended S. 30 was
designed:
mo cure a number of debilitating defects in the evidence-gathering process in organ-
ized crime investigations, to circumscribe defense abuse of pretrial proceedings, to
broaden Federal jurisdiction over syndicated gambling and related corruption where
interstate commerce is affected, to attach and to mitigate the effects of racketeer infil-
tration of legitimate organizations affecting interstate commerce, and to make possi-
ble extended terms of incarceration for the dangerous offenders who prey on our
society.
Id.
16. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1511, 1955 (1988).
17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). Title XI, the other substantive provision of the
OCCA, dealt with the regulation of explosives moving in interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 841-848 (1988). The purpose of title XI was "to protect interstate and foreign commerce
against interference and interruption by reducing the hazard to persons and property arising
from misuse and unsafe or insecure storage of explosive materials." Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1101, 84 Stat. 922, 952.
18. 116 CONG. REC. 35,201 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain that money which the
syndicate uses to infiltrate legitimate business enterprises comes largely from gambling re-
ceipts); see also 116 CONG. REc. 35,294 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff that "illegal gambling
constitutes the criminal syndicates primary source of revenue"); 116 CONG. REC. 18,937
(1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan that "gambling is the greatest source of revenue for organ-
ized crime").
19. See 116 CONG. REC. 35,201 (1970).
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 151 1(a)(3), 1955(a).
21. Id. §§ 1511(d), 1955(a).
22. Id. § 1511(a).
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While title VIII of the OCCA sought to restrict the flow of money into
criminal organizations, RICO attempted to prevent organized crime from
infiltrating legitimate businesses.23 Moreover, on numerous occasions dur-
ing Senate and House debates about RICO, legislators expressed their con-
cern about "the subversion of our economic system by organized criminal
activities."24 Representative Richard H. Poff (R-Va.), one of the House
sponsors of the OCCA, commented that "the growing infestation of racke-
teers into legitimate business enterprises" was perhaps the single most
alarming aspect of the organized crime problem in the United States in re-
cent years.2 5 The Supreme Court also has noted that the major purpose
behind RICO is to prevent such infiltration.26
Although most comments relating to mob infiltration are merely vacuous
diatribes, several legislators actually discussed the specific dangers posed by
such infiltration. For example, in responding to criticisms of the OCCA by
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Senator McClellan listed sev-
eral problems that might develop once a criminal organization penetrates a
business. The criminal enterprise might use terror tactics to gain a larger
share of the market, thereby hurting competitors, bleed the firm of its assets
and then put the company into bankruptcy, employ violence in conducting
business, or create a monopoly and then raise prices to the detriment of
consumers.2 7 A criminal organization might also infiltrate a labor union and
then sell labor peace to businesses, thereby stripping workers of their auton-
omy and hurting them financially.2"
23. This purpose is expressed clearly in the Statement of Findings and Purpose which
precedes the OCCA:
The Congress finds that ... this money and power are increasingly used to infil-
trate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our
democratic processes; [and] organized crime activities in the United States weaken
the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and compet-
ing organizations, interfere with free competition, [and] seriously burden interstate
and foreign commerce ....
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Star. 922, 922-23.
24. 116 CONG. REC. 35,193 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff); see also 116 CONG. REC.
35,196 (1970) (statement by Rep. Celler regarding the main features of the OCCA); 116 CONG.
REC. 35,200 (1970) (statement by Rep. St. Germain regarding organized crime's effect on legit-
imate institutions); 116 CONG. REC. 35,215 (1970) (statement by Rep. Halpern regarding the
"thriving business" of organized crime).
25. 116 CONG. REC. 35,295 (1970).
26. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 584 (1981). Turkette made clear, however,
that RICO was not limited to the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime. Id.
The Court stated that "[t]here is no inconsistency or anomaly in recognizing that § 1962 ap-
plies to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises." Id. at 585.
27. 116 CONG. REC. 18,939 (1970).
28. Id.
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B. The Structure of the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act
The structure of RICO reflects Congress' intent to "[proscribe] certain
kinds of conduct most commonly associated with attempts by organized
crime to gain control or influence over legitimate enterprises." 29 The thrust
of RICO is to prohibit the use of a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire
or operate an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce.30 "Racketeering
activity" is defined to include such specified federal offenses as obstruction of
justice, embezzlement of pension funds, bankruptcy and securities fraud, and
drug activity. 3 Racketeering activity also includes "any act or threat in-
volving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion,
dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for
29. SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, CORPORATE PRACTICE SERIES GUIDE
TO RICO 4-5 (J.C. Fricano ed. 1986). A more direct method of attacking organized crime
would be criminalizing the act of being a racketeer. This strategy, however, would violate the
constitutional prohibition on status offenses. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). Section 1962 actually criminalizes four types of activities involv-
ing "a pattern of racketeering activity or... collection of an unlawful debt." Id. § 1962(a)-(d).
For the sake of simplicity, however, this Article uses the phrase "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity" to refer to both a pattern of racketeering activities and collection of unlawful debt.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A). After listing the indictable state crimes in subpart (A), sec-
tion 1961(1) delineates four classes of federal crimes:
(B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,
United States Code [which relates to bribery, sports bribery, counterfeiting, theft
from interstate shipment, embezzlement from pension and welfare funds, extortion-
ate credit transactions, fraud and related activity in connection with access devices,
the transmission of gambling information, mail fraud, wire fraud, financial institution
fraud, obscene matter, obstruction of justice, obstruction of criminal investigations,
obstruction of State or local law enforcement, tampering with a witness, victim, or an
informant, retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant, interference with
commerce, robbery, or extortion, racketeering, interstate transportation of wagering
paraphernalia, unlawful welfare fund payments, the prohibition of illegal gambling
businesses, the laundering of monetary instruments, engaging in monetary transac-
tions in property derived from specified unlawful activity, use of interstate commerce
facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire, sexual exploitation of children, inter-
state transportation of stolen motor vehicles, interstate transportation of stolen prop-
erty, trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicles parts, white slave traffic],
(C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code (dealing with re-
strictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or... (relating to embezzle-
ment from union funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case
under title 1, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importa-
tion, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States, or (E) any act
which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)(B)-(E) (West Supp. 1990).
[Vol. 40:331
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more than one year." 32 These apparently disparate crimes are tied together
by their frequent connection to business. Absent from this list are "individ-
ual" crimes such as rape, assault, or libel.3 3 Section 1961 also defines "pat-
tern of racketeering activity." This definition imposes an additional element
which a prosecutor or plaintiff must prove under RICO. A "'pattern of
racketeering' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity" within ten
years of each other.34
Section 1962 of RICO uses the definitions of racketeering activity and pat-
tern of racketeering activity to establish four substantive crimes involving an
enterprise.3" RICO prohibits a "person" from acquiring or operating an en-
terprise using money derived from a pattern of racketeering activity. 36 The
statute also restrains an individual from using "a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity ...to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which af-
fect, interstate or foreign commerce." 37 The concern of both prohibitions
centers on organized crime gaining control of established businesses.38
These provisions are distinguished by the manner in which racketeering ac-
tivity is employed to gain control. In the latter provision, an individual em-
ploys racketeering activity as a means of infiltrating a business, while in the
former he employs the racketeering activity to gain the financial resources
needed to acquire or operate a business.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A).
33. 116 CONG. REC. 18,946 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan noting that RICO is
aimed at "economic" and "commercial" crimes).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). At least one of the acts must have "occurred after the effective
date of this chapter [RICO] ... within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after
the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." Id.
35. Id. § 1962(a)-(d). The statute broadly defines the term "enterprise" as "any individ-
ual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. § 1961(4).
36. Id. § 1962(a). A " 'person' includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal
or beneficial interest in property." Id. § 1961(3). Thus, for the purposes of RICO, a "person"
includes business entities as well as natural persons.
37. Id. § 1962(b).
38. In subsection 1962(a), Congress carved out an exception for the purchase of securities
in the open market:
A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without
the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting
another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the
issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their
accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful
debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the out-
standing securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the
power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
Id. § 1962(a). This exception to the general provisions of subsection 1962(a), and the limita-
tion on the exception, indicate congressional concern with mob control of business.
1991]
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Section 1962 also makes it unlawful for "any person employed by or asso-
ciated with any enterprise engaged in... interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.",39 The purpose of
this provision is to prohibit the operation, not the acquisition, of an enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering. This provision does not require the
individual to participate as a principal in the activity. Instead, to violate the
statute, an individual need only be employed by or associated with the organi-
zation and use racketeering activity "to conduct or participate... in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs."'
Section 1962 also includes a subsection that weaves conspiracy into the
statute. Subsection (d) prohibits "any person" from conspiring "to violate
any of the provisions ... of this section."41 Engaging in a conspiracy to
commit any substantive violation of RICO subjects a defendant to the same
penalties as engaging in the activity as a principal.
A violation of section 1962 is punishable by a fine, imprisonment for not
more than twenty years, or both.42 In addition, the forfeiture provision re-
quires a violator to forfeit to the government any interest acquired or main-
tained by means of a pattern of racketeering activity, any interest in an
enterprise operated or maintained through such activity, or "any property
constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained" this
way.43 The forfeiture provision is one of the most potent weapons in the
39. Id. § 1962(c).
40. Ia
41. Id. § 1962(d).
42. Id. § 1963(a). This section provides in part: "Whoever violates any provision of sec-
tion 1962 of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years
... or both .. "
43. d This section provides that violators:
[S]hall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law-




(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence
over;
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or
participated in the conduct of in violation of section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection
in violation of section 1962.
[Vol. 40:331
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RICO arsenal because it allows the government to drain an enterprise of its
financial resources.
Section 1963 contains two provisions which allow the government to pro-
tect an enterprise's assets from dissolution pending the resolution of the case.
Under certain circumstances, a district court has authority to issue an in-
junction" or a temporary restraining order, and the temporary restraining
order may even be issued without notice.4" For a temporary restraining or-
der, the government must show probable cause that the property would be
subject to forfeiture if the defendant were convicted and that notice to the
defendant would jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture."
Civil remedies are also available under RICO, both for the government
and for private parties who are injured by the alleged pattern of racketeering
activity.47 District courts have the power to prevent violations of RICO by
issuing divestiture orders, by restricting the future activities of those found
liable, and by ordering the dissolution or reorganization of an enterprise.48
Pending final resolution of the case, the United States Attorney General has
44. "Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or
injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action
to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture .... ." Id.
§ 1963(d)(1).
The court is empowered to issue such orders:
(A) upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation of section
1962 of this chapter and alleging that the property with respect to which the order is
sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section;
or
(B) prior to the filing of such an indictment or information, if, after notice to
persons appearing to have an interest in the property and opportunity for a hearing,
the court determines that-
(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will prevail on the
issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will result in the property
being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made
unavailable for forfeiture; and
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through the entry of
the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the or-
der is to be entered ....
Id Unless extended by the court for good cause, this order is only effective for ninety days.
Id
45. Id § 1963(d)(2).
46. Id The temporary restraining order "shall expire not more than ten days after the
date on which it is entered, unless extended for good cause shown or unless the party against
whom it is entered consents to an extension of a longer period." Id
47. Id § 1964.
48. Id § 1964(a).
1991]
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the authority to institute proceedings against persons engaged in racketeer-
ing and to seek relief as provided for under the statute.49
Although missing in the Senate's original version of the bill, RICO also
gives "[a]ny person injured in his business or property" by a section 1962
violation the ability to sue in district court and recover both treble damages
and "the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 50 The
Supreme Court recognized that this section "bring[s] .. .the pressure of
'private attorneys general' on a serious national problem for which public
prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate."5" The Court held that
Congress, in enacting this subsection, intended to expand the number of peo-
ple who would police RICO.
5 2
C. RICO's "Pattern" Requirement
The requirement of a pattern of racketeering activity lies at the heart of
RICO. Whether the charge comes in a criminal prosecution or in a civil suit
under section 1964, the predicate acts must form a pattern. Both courts and
commentators have struggled to understand this term. According to RICO,
a pattern of racketeering activity "requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the
last of which occurred within ten years ... after the commission of a prior
act of racketeering activity."53 The Supreme Court, in H.J. Inc. v. North-
western Bell Telephone Co., -4 addressed whether two acts alone will satisfy
this requirement or whether plaintiffs and prosecutors must allege some ad-
49. Id. § 1964(b). Critics of RICO often focus on the expanded penalties for individual
defendants. Senator McClellan and other legislators, however, focused on the forfeiture and
injunction remedies. For example, in defending S. 30 against critics during the House debates,
Senator McClellan said the three primary devices for combating organized crime were forfei-
ture, civil antitrust remedies, and civil investigative procedures. 116 CONG. REc. 18,939
(1970).
In addition to allowing federal prosecutors to make civil investigative demands of private
parties for documents relating to RICO prosecutions, the OCCA contained other procedural
innovations which could simplify RICO prosecutions. See 18 U.S.C. § 1968. The statute gave
United States Attorneys the power to convene special grand juries to investigate organized
crime, provided immunity for certain witnesses in organized crime cases, established a witness
protection plan, and provided for the use of depositions to preserve evidence. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3331, 3503, 6002 (1988). These provisions are related to the substantive provisions of title
IX of OCCA in that they make RICO prosecutions easier. For example, the witness protec-
tion plan's liberalized immunity provisions make it more likely that insiders will be willing to
testify against organized crime famifies.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
51. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987).
52. Id at 152.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
54. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
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RICO's -Pattern Requirement
ditional element or elements. In H.J. Inc., the majority found that two acts
were not enough, but were merely "a minimum necessary condition for the
existence of such a pattern.",55 According to the majority, Congress had a
reason for using the word "requires" in the definition rather than the word
"means," which was used in a number of other definitions. 56 By this choice
of words, Congress indicated that "[s]ection 1961(5) concerns only the mini-
mum number of predicates necessary to establish a pattern; and it assumes
that there is something to a RICO pattern beyond simply the number of
predicate acts involved."" To support this interpretation, the majority cited
a speech by Senator McClellan, the principal sponsor of the OCCA. In this
speech, he states that "proof of two acts of racketeering activity, without
more, does not establish a pattern."-"
The majority also quoted Senator McClellan's speech in defending its in-
terpretation of this "something beyond":
[A] person cannot "be subjected to the sanctions of title IX simply
for committing two widely separated and isolated criminal of-
fenses." Instead, "[t]he term 'pattern' itself requires the showing
of a relationship" between the predicates, and of "'the threat of
continuing activity.' .... It is this factor of continuity plus relation-
ship which combines to produce a pattern." 59
Based on RICO's legislative history, the Court established the two-pronged
continuity and relationship test, which Justice White first suggested in foot-
note fourteen of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.'
In interpreting the term "relationship," which is not found in the statute,
the majority looked to the definition of "pattern" contained in the Danger-
ous Special Offender Act, title X of the OCCA.6" As originally formulated,
the Dangerous Special Offender Act (DSO) provided enhanced sanctions for
certain convicted felons.62 Under the DSO, if a court found a defendant to
be either a habitual criminal, a "professional" criminal, or an organized
55. Id. at 237.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 238 (emphasis in original).
58. Id. (quoting Sen. McClellan, 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970)).
59. Id. at 239 (emphasis in original).
60. 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985). The Court noted that "the infiltration of legitimate
business normally requires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing
activity to be effective." Id. (emphasis added).
61. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239-40; see Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, § 1001, 84 Stat. 922, 948-52.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1982) (repealed in part by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98- 473, tit. II, §§ 212(a)(1)-(2), 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2031). During a felony trial, a
federal prosecutor could request that the court find the defendant to be a "dangerous special
offender," as defined by title X of the OCCA.
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crime leader, he could receive a twenty-five year sentence regardless of the
sentence for the particular felony.6 3 Although the statutory definition of ha-
bitual criminal does not mention the term "pattern," the DSO requires the
defendant to have participated in a pattern of criminal conduct. Unlike the
predicate acts for a RICO violation, which are specified state and federal
crimes, "criminal conduct" under the DSO is broadly defined to include vio-
lations of the laws of any jurisdiction."M The definition of pattern is equally
broad, providing that "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces crimi-
nal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims,
or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events."' 65  Following the dicta of
Sedima, the majority in HJ. Inc. suggested that this definition of pattern
should be imported from the DSO into RICO.6 The majority believed that
Congress did not intend "any more constrained a notion of the relationships
between predicates" in RICO than in the DSO.67
The four concurring justices, however, disagreed with this interpretation
of the statute. They regarded as determinative the absences of similar defini-
tions in the two titles.6" Justice Scalia commented in his concurrence:
"[U]nfortunately, if normal (and sensible) rules of statutory construction
were followed, the existence of § 3575(e)-which is the definition contained
in [title X] that was explicitly not rendered applicable to RICO-suggests
that whatever pattern might mean in RICO, it assuredly does not mean
that."
, 69
Because there was no discussion of this question during the Congressional
debates over the OCCA, it is difficult to know Congress' intent. Only Sena-
tor McClellan's speech, in response to attacks upon the legislation by the
63. Id A habitual criminal is an individual who has been convicted of three felonies on
separate occasions, the present conviction within five years of the last. Id For the court to
find the defendant a professional criminal, he must have committed the offense as part of a
pattern of criminal conduct, which is defined to include violations of the laws of any jurisdic-
tion. In addition, the court has to find that the defendant exhibited special criminal skills and
that he derived a substantial part of his income from criminal activity. Finally, a defendant
may be found to be a "dangerous special offender" if the offense was committed in furtherance
of a conspiracy of three or more people to engage in a pattern of criminal conduct, and the
defendant either played a leadership role, employed violence, or bribed officials. Id This pro-
vision was designed to deal primarily with the organized crime offender presumably because
organized crime involved multiple defendants in a conspiracy to commit various criminal acts.
Id.
64. Id
65. Id. § 3575(e).
66. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 251 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 252 (emphasis in original).
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ACLU and by the American Bar Committee of New York, offers any en-
lightenment. In discussing the meaning of "pattern of conduct" under the
DSO, Senator McClellan stated: "[C]learly, just as in title IX, where the
concept of 'pattern' is employed, the intent of S. 30 is clear, on its face and in
the Senate committee report, that the term 'pattern' itself conveys the re-
quirement of a relationship between various criminal acts."7 ° Although the
quote is not a model of clarity, it does support the majority's interpretation.
At least Senator McClellan seemed to view the term "pattern" as having the
same meaning in each Act, thus requiring some interrelationship between
the predicate acts.
The same cannot be said of the continuity prong of the majority's test.
Senator McClellan's speech does not support the inclusion of continuity in
the definition of pattern. Although Senator McClellan quoted a paragraph
from the Senate committee report which mentions continuity and relation-
ship, the Senator commented that "[t]he term 'pattern' itself requires the
showing of a relationship." ' He rephrased the committee comment, em-
phasizing the requirement of a relationship between the acts, but he did not
mention continuity at all. Moreover, the paragraph of the Senate report
mentions continuity in a particular context: "The infiltration of legitimate
business normally requires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the
threat of continuing activity to be effective." '72 The committee report states
that "this factor of continuity plus relationship ... combines to produce a
pattern.",7 3 If "continuity" were a separate requirement apart from the
number of acts, as the majority argues, the Senate report would have said
that infiltration normally requires more than two acts of racketeering, not
just one, plus the threat of continuing activity. Therefore, it appears that the
Senate committee interpreted continuity as resulting from the commission of
multiple acts. Under this interpretation, "continuity" comes from the multi-
plicity of acts themselves; it is not a separate requirement beyond the predi-
cate acts. This interpretation would also explain Senator McClellan's failure
to mention "continuity" after quoting from the Senate report. For the Sena-
tor, the "something beyond" was merely a relationship among the acts.
In addition to misinterpreting Senator McClellan's comment, the H.J.
Inc. majority used legislative commentary selectively in establishing its two-
pronged test. First, the Senator's comment was made over four months after
the Senate passed S. 30, and it was only a small part of a long, comprehen-
70. 116 CONG. REC. 18,943-44 (1970).
71. Id. at 18,940.
72. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) (emphasis added).
73. Id.
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sive defense of the OCCA.74 Although Senator McClellan apparently inter-
preted the language to require a relationship between acts, there was no
mention of "something beyond" the number of acts requirement in any of
the Senate discussions on the pattern of racketeering. Further, Senator Ro-
man L. Hruska (R-Neb.), another sponsor of the bill, apparently did not
believe anything else was required; he simply said that pattern "is defined in
terms of a number of existing criminal offenses characteristic of organized
crime activity."" He said nothing about either continuity or relationship.
Similarly, no member of the House mentioned these terms, even though
the House Judiciary Committee was considering the bill when Senator Mc-
Clellan made his comment. Because numerous congressmen mentioned
RICO's multiple act requirement when the bill came before them, it cannot
be argued that House members neglected the provision entirely. Most con-
gressmen simply quoted from the text of the statute, noting that "pattern is
defined to require at least two racketeering acts."76 Neither relationship nor
continuity was discussed.
Comments by several congressmen indicate their belief that two acts of
racketeering by themselves would fulfill the pattern requirement. Represen-
tative William F. Ryan (D-N.Y.), one of three House Judiciary Committee
members who dissented on the OCCA, attacked the pattern requirement be-
cause of the burden it placed on prosecutors.77 Federal prosecutors, he ar-
gued, would have to "prove beyond a reasonable doubt two illegal acts-not
just one-absent a prior conviction."" 8 If he believed RICO required it,
Representative Ryan would have noted the additional burden of proving a
relationship among the acts and a threat of continuity.79 Even Representa-
tive Poff, one of the bill's House sponsors and a member of the House sub-
committee responsible for the bill, implied that the term "pattern" referred
to the number of acts of racketeering. In summarizing the bill prior to the
74. Senator McClellan's speech was a detailed response to various criticisms of S. 30 by
the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Bar Association of the City of New
York. The speech covered 44 pages in the Congressional Record. 116 CONG. REc. 18,912-56
(1970).
75. Id. at 602.
76. Id. at 35,196 (statement of Rep. Cellar, a member of the House committee which
proposed S. 30).
77. Id. at 35,208.
78. Id.
79. See also id. at 35,205 (comments of Rep. Mikva, another dissenting member of the
House committee). Representative Mikva's gambling hypothetical (proposing that even a
poker game which goes on past midnight may bring charges of syndicated gambling) involves
two predicate acts and nothing more, implying that he did not believe anything else was re-
quired to prove a pattern. Id.
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House vote, Representative Poff said that pattern "means simply two or
more acts of racketeering." 80
As a whole, these vague comments hardly justify the continuity and rela-
tionship "test" elaborated in H.J. Inc. Senator McClellan's speech supports
a relationship requirement, not a separate requirement of continuity or a
threat of continuity. Further, numerous members of Congress apparently
believed two acts of racketeering, without more, would satisfy the statute.
Thus, although legislative history is generally a thin branch upon which to
rest a judicial decision, it certainly does not support H.J. Inc. 's two-pronged
test.
II. INTERPRETATIONS OF "PATTERN" IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Justice Scalia's concurrence in H.J. Inc. described the post-Sedima inter-
pretations of RICO's pattern requirement as "the widest and most persistent
circuit split on an issue of federal law in recent memory."'" The disparate
interpretations of the term "pattern" by the appellate courts, despite some
guidance by the Supreme Court, indicate that the pattern requirement is am-
biguous at best and is unconstitutionally vague at worst. If the circuit courts
do not understand what Congress meant by pattern, a nonlawyer could not
be expected to understand the term.8 2 Because Justice Scalia's criticism of
RICO's pattern requirement is based on a perception that the circuits' inter-
pretations are too wide-ranging, it is important to understand these "kalei-
doscopic" interpretations.83
A. Policies and Factors
1. Policy Concerns Motivating the Pattern Requirement
There are at least three justifications for creating heightened penalties for
the commission of multiple criminal acts over a period of time. First, a legis-
lature might desire the marginal deterrence the additional penalties will pro-
80. Id. at 35,295. This statement was made over four months after Senator McClellan's
comment, indicating that the Senator's interpretation of the term pattern had not been widely
accepted, if even known.
81. 492 U.S. 229, 251 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
82. If a nonlawyer could not understand the term, then he did not receive the warning the
due process clause requires.
83. To aid the reader in understanding the various approaches, this section consists of two
subparts. The first subsection explains the various policies which might lie at the heart of a
statutory scheme like RICO. Understanding the variety of possible policies behind such a
statute may help to explain why different courts established such dissimilar tests for finding a
pattern. The second subsection catalogues the various factors which courts included in their
respective tests.
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vide.8 4 Where an individual has already committed one crime, thereby
incurring the risk of a particular penalty, the reduced penalty for subsequent
acts may give him an incentive to commit other acts. For example, an indi-
vidual who has already committed wire fraud by misrepresenting a business
deal to one buyer, will be inclined to call another potential buyer if the addi-
tional penalty for the additional act is less than the original penalty for the
original act. Having already incurred the risk of being jailed for period x
(the average period of incarceration for one act of wire fraud), he will have
an incentive to continue if an additional act will, on average, add only y
period to the sentence (where y is substantially less than x). Assuming the
reward for success in the second crime is the same or greater than the re-
ward for success in the first crime, he would be risking a little more jail time
for twice the payoff."5 By raising the penalty for subsequent crimes, a legis-
lative body might be attempting to remedy this problem. Committing an
additional criminal act would subject an individual to at least twice the pen-
alty of committing only one act.
The risk of increased injury might be a second motivating factor behind
the establishment of heightened penalties for multiple crimes. Certain activi-
ties are proscribed because they injure people in some way; the assigned pen-
alty somehow correlates to the injury inflicted.8 6 For example, mail fraud is
assigned a penalty of x and murder a penalty of x + y because the latter
injury is much more serious. When a defendant perpetrates the less injuri-
ous crime upon multiple victims, however, the increased injury results in a
84. See Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
259 (1972).
The extent of offenders' specialization in crime is shown to be particularly influenced
by the marginal penalty: the additional punishment imposed for the "last" offense
committed by an offender. For example, if the marginal penalty is zero, as is the case
when the court imposes concurrent imprisonment terms for a number of offenses,
offenders will have an incentive to participate in criminal activity on a relatively full-
time basis.
Id. at 264; see also Block & Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price
Fixer Now and Then?, 68 GEo. L.J. 1131, 1132 n.6 (1980) (to deter criminal acts, the criminal
sanctions must impose expected costs that exceed the expected benefits).
85. This reasoning may be compared to the economic concept of diminishing marginal
returns. "The law of diminishing marginal returns holds that as the amount of some input is
increased... while... other inputs are held constant, the resulting increments in output will
decrease beyond some point." E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC THEORY
AND APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 1986).
86. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1124-27 (1972); Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System,
12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 292 (1983); Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of
Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 882 (1984).
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heightened penalty. In some cases, the penalties of the lesser crime will be
equal to that of the more serious crime.8 7
RICO's heightened penalties may be based upon the assumption that mul-
tiple criminal acts which are not "isolated or sporadic" are often more inju-
rious than separate acts. This assumption may be predicated on the
requirement that RICO crimes involve a business. Because a business usu-
ally involves multiple individuals, there is a greater likelihood that a predi-
cate act under RICO will cause more injury than a similar act standing
alone. Accordingly, the risk of increased injury under a RICO violation jus-
tifies heightened penalties. Otherwise, these especially harmful activities
would escape adequate deterrence.8"
Finally, fears about structural crime might cause a legislative body to pass
a statute which raises penalties for multiple criminal acts. Structural crime
is any crime which springs from a criminal infrastructure. 9 With structural
crime, criminal acts are somehow connected to an organization whose exist-
ence is separate from the acts. As with planned crime, proof of multiple,
connected acts might be used as a proxy for such an organization. Multiple,
connected criminal acts often originate through a criminal enterprise. The
most obvious example is the stereotypic Mafia-a highly specialized and ex-
tensive organization which controls a variety of criminal operations. Struc-
tural crime, however, is not limited to this type of organization.' If a group
87. Of course, because actual injuries vary based upon the particular circumstances of
each victim, the assigned penalties only approximate the injury. The poor parent who is de-
frauded of his life savings of $10,000 through a savings account scam is injured more than the
wealthy investor whose broker defrauds him of the same amount by churning his account
(churning is excessive trading in order to generate commissions). Although the legislature
cannot envision every possibility, it gives each of these possibilities appropriate weight in its
calculation of an appropriate penalty for fraud.
88. Of course, this view of crime assumes that each criminal act causes separate injury. In
fact, an individual might be injured only once even though the defendant committed a number
of criminal acts to inflict this injury.
89. For example, the "combination of organizational complexity and obscured individual
responsibility" inherent in most corporations may give rise to such corporations committing
structural crimes. Note, Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation: A New Approach to
Corporate Sentencing, 89 YALE L.J. 353, 358 (1979). In such a situation, "a corporation com-
mits a criminal offense but no criminally culpable individual can be identified." Id (citing
United States v. American Stevedores, Inc., 310 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1962), cert denied, 371
U.S. 969 (1963) (principal officers, directors, and shareholders acquitted of tax evasion where
corporation was convicted)).
90. See generally Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the
Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L.R. 419, 466-68 (1980) (businessmen acting
in concert are more likely to undertake risks including criminal acts than are individuals);
Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal
Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227 (1979) (discussing increased use of criminal sanctions
against corporate criminals) [hereinafter Corporate Crime].
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of corporate officers strips a corporation of its assets over a period of time,
that would also satisfy the requirements for structural crime.9 Where sev-
eral members of a securities firm develop and implement a plan to bilk cli-
ents, that crime would be structural. In all these cases, the criminal acts
spring from a criminal infrastructure-a criminal organization with multiple
members, each of whom has certain responsibilities within the structure.
When a group of individuals has established such a structure, a particular
crime has a greater chance of succeeding. First, the organization is usually
operating from a plan, which increases the likelihood of success. Also, indi-
viduals in the organization probably have specialized roles based upon their
individual abilities. The likelihood that the crime will succeed is greater
when the individual participants need only focus on a narrow area for which
they have special talents or knowledge. Furthermore, a criminal infrastruc-
ture, once established, may live beyond the particular scheme. Having suc-
ceeded once with an arrangement, the same individuals may perpetrate a
similar crime. More importantly, the infrastructure may survive even if a
few of the participants are replaced. Like a corporation which lives on after
its chief executive officer dies, the organization may survive the loss of indi-
vidual members. These two dangers-increased likelihood of success and
risk of future crime-justify the imposition of heightened penalties.
2. Factors That Demonstrate A Pattern of Racketeering
The federal circuit courts have looked to many factors in determining
whether a defendant has met the pattern requirement. Some of the factors
are numerical: the number of criminal acts; the number of distinct injuries;
the number of victims; the number of perpetrators; and the number of
"schemes," "episodes," or "transactions." Although the first four factors
are clear, what constitutes a scheme, episode, or transaction is less certain.
As the majority pointed out in H.J. Inc.: "A 'scheme' is in the eye of the
beholder, since whether a scheme exists depends on the level of generality at
which criminal activity is viewed.... There is no obviously 'correct' level of
generality for courts to use in describing the criminal activity alleged in
RICO litigation."92 The majority's criticism is equally applicable to the
91. See Corporate Crime, supra note 90, at 1243.
[Tihis theory [of corporate blameworthiness] recognized that generally the criminal
acts of a modern corporation result not from the isolated activity of a single agent,
but from the complex interactions of many agents in a bureaucratic setting. Illegal
conduct by a corporation is the consequence of corporate processes such as standard
operating procedures and hierarchical decisionmaking.
Id.
92. 492 U.S. 229, 241 n.3 (1989).
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terms "episode" or "transaction." Courts generally define these terms as a
series of criminal activities with a common purpose, goal, or objective.
In addition to numerical factors, courts have focused upon particular
traits of the criminal activity: the length of time over which the crime was
committed; the character of the activity-whether it involved murder or
mail fraud, for example; and the connection of the crime to a continuing
organization.9 3 Finally, some circuit courts have asked whether the acts are
interrelated, as indicated by a similarity of purposes, results, participants,
victims, or methods.94
B. Inconsistent Circuit Court Interpretations of "Pattern of Racketeering"
Before H.J. Inc.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in HJ. Inc., the views of the vari-
ous circuits could have been divided into roughly five categories: (1) multi-
ple schemes, (2) multiple factors, (3) continuity/relationship, (4) multiple
acts plus continuity, and (5) relationship.93 The following hypotheticals are
intended to serve as a standard by which to compare the various circuit
courts' interpretations of the pattern requirement.
1. Civil and Criminal Hypotheticals
It may be easier to distinguish between similar tests when each test is
compared to a common set of facts. These two hypotheticals are based upon
the Second Circuit's leading pattern cases, United States v. Indelicato96 and
Beauford v. Helmsley.97
In the criminal hypothetical, the defendant murders two members of an
organized crime "family" for the purpose of bringing stability to that family.
93. See generally Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986) (discussing the
types of criminal activities necessary to prove a pattern).
94. These courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead in looking to the definition of
pattern in the Dangerous Special Offenders Act. Compare infra text accompanying notes 180-
83 with infra text accompanying notes 185-225.
95. For purposes of clarity, this Article attempts to organize these tests from the most
restrictive to the most broad. In every scenario, the relationship test is the most encompassing
because it requires nothing more than two interrelated acts of racketeering activity within the
ten-year period. See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text. Likewise, in most cases the
multiple schemes test will be the most narrow because it requires two significant criminal
events separate in time. See Superior Oil, 785 F.2d at 252. Between these extremes, however,
the categorization breaks down in many situations. This Article merely attempts to impose a
structure on a body of case law that is inconsistent and contradictory.
96. United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 110 S. Ct. 56 (1989)
(criminal RICO prosecution).
97. Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir.), vacated, 492 U.S. 914 (1989) (civil
RICO action).
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His orders come from an organized crime "Commission" whose members
regulate the behavior of member families. Acting alone, the defendant com-
mits the murders at the same instant by shooting the victims in a local
restaurant.
In the civil hypothetical, the defendant company sells widgets through a
national network of distributors. Each distributor leases a geographic area
on a yearly basis. In connection with an offer to sell permanent distributor-
ship rights in these areas to lessees, the company commits mail fraud. All
200 offering letters contain a material misrepresentation about the average
profit of local distributors. Only fifty distributorships are purchased in the
initial offering, so the company determines not to make any further solicita-
tions. It will maintain a dual structure of owned and leased distributorships.
2. Multiple Scheme as Applied by the Eighth Circuit before H.J. Inc.
Before the Supreme Court rejected the multiple scheme interpretation in
H.£ Inc., the Eighth Circuit required more than one scheme to find a pat-
tern of racketeering.9" In Madden v. Gluck 99 the Eighth Circuit explained
that "although the alleged acts were sufficiently related to form a pattern,"
the acts "lacked sufficient continuity to form a 'pattern of racketeering activ-
ity.' ,,o Through this interpretation, the Madden Court implied that be-
cause the defendants never committed the illegal acts before or in another
context, the requisite continuity was lacking.' 0
The Eighth Circuit believed that the word "activity" implied a unity of
purpose among several acts. Therefore, when the statute required a pattern
of racketeering activity, rather than a pattern of racketeering acts, the stat-
ute implied that multiple acts as a part of one activity could not satisfy the
requirement. The Eighth Circuit viewed "scheme" as synonymous with "ac-
tivity," thus explaining the requirement of at least two schemes to satisfy the
statute.
98. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648, 649-50 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd,
492 U.S. 229 (1989); Madden v. Gluck, 815 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 823
(1987). Since the Supreme Court's decision in H.J. Inc., the Eighth Circuit has addressed the
pattern question only once, in Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Finance Co., 886 F.2d 986 (8th
Cir. 1989). See infra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
99. 815 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 823 (1987).
100. Madden, 815 F.2d at 1164 (citing Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir.
1986)). In Madden, the plaintiff creditors and employees accused the defendant managers of
looting the corporation through a series of illegal activities such as check kiting and asset
diversion. Id.
101. Id; see, e.g., Superior Oil, 785 F.2d at 257.
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The Eighth Circuit defined "scheme" as a number of criminal acts in fur-
therance of a single purpose,1 2 a definition followed by many circuit
judges.010  The majority in HJ. Inc., however, believed that the multiple
scheme requirement adopted by the Eighth Circuit brought "a rigidity to the
available methods of proving a pattern." 1" This rigidity would doom a
RICO charge under the facts of either the civil or criminal hypothetical be-
cause both violations are motivated by a single goal. Neither a large amount
of injury nor a multiplicity of crimes would overcome the existence of a
single scheme.
3. Multiple Factors as Applied in the Third, Seventh, and Sixth Circuits
After the Supreme Court's decision in HJ. Inc., the Third, Seventh, and
Sixth Circuits followed the continuity and relationship test. Before that de-
cision, however, none of these circuits engaged in that two-step analysis. In-
stead, these circuits employed a multiple factor test to determine if a pattern
of racketeering was present. The multiple factor test is distinct from the
continuity and relationship test, which employs the two-pronged analysis
before discussing other facts.105 Beyond the initial similarity of employing
multiple factors, the tests diverge because they use varying factors and weigh
the factors differently.
a. The Third Circuit's Six-Factor Test
The Third Circuit, in Saporito v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 106 consid-
ered six factors in judging whether a pattern was present: "(1) the number
of unlawful acts; (2) the length of time over which the acts were committed;
(3) the similarity of the acts; (4) the number of victims; (5) the number of
perpetrators; and (6) the character of the unlawful activity."10 7 The court
considered these six factors in the context of a pension fund fraud that a
corporation perpetrated upon selected employees. 08 Without any hint of
102. See H.J. Inc., 829 F.2d at 650; Madden, 815 F.2d at 1164; Ornest v. Delaware North
Cos., 818 F.2d 651, 652 (8th Cir. 1987).
103. See International Data Bank Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987); Lipin
Enters., Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1986).
104. HJ. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240-41.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
56 (1989); United Energy Owners Comm., Inc. v. United States Energy Management Sys.,
Inc., 837 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1988); Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987).
106. 843 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1049
(1989).
107. Id. at 676-77.
108. Id. at 668-69. The complaint alleged that Combustion Engineering discriminated
against the 32 plaintiffs by inducing them to retire under a particular retirement plan while
informing other potential retirees of a more lucrative plan soon to be instituted. Id at 669.
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analysis, the court evaluated the particular factors by comparing the facts of
Saporito to the facts of two previous Third Circuit cases discussed below."19
In Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First National State, 1 o two corpora-
tions and several individuals perpetrated twenty-three identical acts of fraud
upon twenty victims. In contrast, Marshall-Silver Construction Co. v. Men-
del 1. involved two "active" perpetrators, six criminal acts, and one victim.
Because Saporito involved one corporate and four individual perpetrators,
thirty-two acts of fraud, and thirty-two victims, the Third Circuit said the
case came closer to the factual situation in Barticheck than in Mendel.
1 12
The court implied that none of the six factors were given special weight. 13
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit recently admitted that the number of victims
and the number of perpetrators were the most significant considerations in
its multi-factor analysis.114 While the court did mention the RICO statute
and its legislative history, it failed to incorporate them into its definition of
pattern. Other circuits, meanwhile, based their analysis on one of these
sources."1 5 The Third Circuit, however, seemed to have fashioned its own
definition of pattern out of whole cloth. Moreover, the categories were ex-
tremely flexible. For example, why should the corporation's misrepresenta-
tion about the retirement plan be viewed as thirty-two acts rather than
merely one act perpetrated against thirty-two victims? Also, why should the
number of victims and perpetrators be given special weight? Giving these
factors particular weight, without admitting as much, makes the court's
analysis even more suspect.
Based on these cases, however, the Third Circuit probably would have
found a pattern in the civil hypothetical. A crime involving two hundred
acts of fraud and fifty victims would be more extensive than the crimes in
either Barticheck or Saporito. The Third Circuit would not have found a
pattern in the criminal hypothetical, however, unless the court actually be-
gan to consider the character of the crime, given the small number of victims
and perpetrators.
109. Id. at 677.
110. 832 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1987).
111. 835 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1987).
112. Saporito, 843 F.2d at 677.
113. Id. at 676-77.
114. Recently, the Third Circuit acknowledged that, before HJ. Inc., these two factors
were the most significant in analyzing the pattern requirement. Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d
755, 758 (3d Cir. 1989).
115. United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 56 (1989)
(analysis using RICO statute and legislative history); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d
252, 255 (8th Cir. 1986) (same).
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b. The Seventh Circuit's Four-Factor Analysis
In Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, '16 the Seventh Circuit first announced
the four factors that determined whether the predicate acts were sufficiently
continuous to form a pattern. These four factors included: "(1) the number
and variety of predicate acts and the length of time over which [the predicate
acts] were committed, (2) the number of victims, (3) the presence of separate
schemes and (4) the occurrence of distinct injuries."'1 17 The Morgan court
claimed that each case should be evaluated upon its particular facts, with no
one factor weighing more heavily than another.118 In application, however,
the number of "schemes," "episodes," or "transactions" usually proved
dispositive. 119
In Brandt v. Schal Associates, 120 the court refused to find a pattern where
the complaint "posit[ed] only multiple acts in furtherance of a single episode
of fraud by [the defendants] against a single victim."' 21 After repeating the
four "relevant factors" enunciated in Morgan, the court concluded that, as
in its recent RICO cases,122 "the predicate acts alleged by [the plaintiff did]
not involve multiple injuries, multiple victims or multiple schemes." 123 The
court did not explain why it gave such short shrift to the first prong of the
four-part test. If the plaintiff's claim was correct, the defendants had com-
mitted numerous dissimilar criminal acts over at least several months. Nev-
ertheless, the court found no pattern of racketeering activity. Moreover,
although the Brandt court claimed to rest its holding on the lack of multiple
victims or multiple injuries, as well as the presence of only one scheme, pre-
vious cases demonstrated that the key requirement was multiple schemes or
116. 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986).
117. Id. at 975. Comparing these factors to the six factors in the Third Circuit's test, the
Seventh Circuit has merely collapsed three factors into one prong-the number of acts, the
similarity of acts, and the time covered by the crime. What distinguishes the Seventh Circuit's
approach is its consideration of the number of separate schemes and distinct injuries rather
than the number of perpetrators and the character of the activity.
118. Id. at 975-76.
119. See infra note 126.
120. 854 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1988).
121. Id. at 952. The plaintiff, assignee of subcontractor Crescent, alleged that Northwest-
ern University and its construction manager concealed design defects in the curtainwall which
Crescent was hired to build. I. at 949. The plaintiff also charged the defendants with threat-
ening to terminate Crescent's contract if the work was not performed, with making false back
charges to Crescent, and with various acts of coercion. Id. at 950.
122. Id. at 952-53 (citing Jones v. Lampe, 845 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1988); Medical Emer-
gency Serv. Assocs. v. Foulke, 844 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1988); Lipin Enters. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322
(7th Cir. 1986)).
123. Id. at 953. Furthermore, because the operation would necessarily end with the com-
pletion of the construction project, there was little threat of continuing criminal activity.
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transactions. 124 Between 1985 and 1989 the Seventh Circuit found a pattern
in only one case involving a single scheme or transaction, and in that case
there were three thousand injuries. 
25
Judging by these cases, the Seventh Circuit would almost certainly not
have found a pattern in the criminal hypothetical. There was one transac-
tion in the criminal hypothetical, and there were only two crimes, two vic-
tims, and two injuries. The court has never considered the type of crime as a
relevant factor, so the fact that the crimes were murders should not have
affected the analysis. Whether the civil hypothetical would have constituted
a pattern poses a more difficult question. Because all of the acts were in
furtherance of a single scheme, that probably would have doomed a RICO
charge in spite of the relatively large number of acts, victims, and injuries.
Nevertheless, the court might have regarded fifty victims as a large enough
number to tip the balance in favor of finding a pattern.
c. The Sixth Circuit's Multiple-Factor Test
While the Sixth Circuit initially appeared to require nothing more than
two acts of racketeering within the statutory period,1 26 in Fleischhauer v.
Feltner it explicitly adopted a multi-factor test. 127 The Sixth Circuit first
accepted Sedima's proposition that "while two acts are necessary, they may
124. In Illinois Department of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985), cited by
the Morgan court, the defendant mailed nine fraudulent sales tax returns over a nine-month
period. IM at 313. Although the Illinois State Government presumably was the only victim,
the court held these "clearly distinct transactions" were enough to establish a pattern. Id
Similarly, in Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1987), the court found that two acts of
mail fraud would constitute a pattern because these were "clearly distinct transactions ongoing
over a period of time." Id at 1028. Because only two crimes were committed, there could
have been only two injuries. The presence of multiple transactions, however, proved disposi-
tive in this situation as well. Id.
125. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987).
126. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989) (discussing
United States v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1988)). The Court stated: "Nor can we
agree with those courts that have suggested that a pattern is established merely by proving two
predicate acts, see, e.g., United States v. Jennings. " HJ. Inc., 492 U.S. at 236. In Jennings, the
government charged the defendant with using and distributing cocaine. 842 F.2d at 160. Two
phone calls made two hours apart were the predicate acts for the purposes of RICO. Id at
162. Noting that predicate acts may be considered "separate" even though they are proximate
in time, the court stated: "[I]f the conduct of the defendant Jennings in the two telephone calls
indicates two acts of racketeering activity, a pattern has been shown." Id. at 163. The court
reversed the RICO conviction on the merits, however, finding that the second phone call did
not implicate Jennings. Id. at 164.
127. Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1297-98 (6th Cir. 1989). The factors include:
"the number and variety of predicate acts and the length of time over which they were com-




not be sufficient." 2 ' Then, the court of appeals chose to follow the tests
enunciated by the Third and Seventh Circuits. 2 9 The Feltner court gave no
statutory basis for its selection of factors, nor did it explain why these fac-
tors, and not others, were relevant in showing a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity. The Sixth Circuit also did not discuss the distinctions between the
Third Circuit's and the Seventh Circuit's views. Some of the factors appar-
ently proved dispositive, while others were completely ignored, when the
multiple factor template was imposed upon the case at bar.'30 Like the
other circuits, the Feltner court chose the factors it would apply. Even
though there was only one fraudulent scheme, the court found dispositive
the number of separate acts (nine), the number of victims (nineteen), the
number of defendants (five), and the length of the scheme (apparently ten
years).' 3 ' The court believed that this amounted to a pattern of racketeer-
ing. The court, however, gave no hint as to whether it would use these fac-
tors, or a different group of factors, in analyzing future cases.
Given this limited guidance, the Sixth Circuit probably would reach dif-
ferent results in the criminal and civil hypotheticals. Unless the character of
the activity-murder-was given greater weight, the brevity of the scheme
and the dearth of victims and perpetrators would prevent the court from
finding a pattern of racketeering activity in the criminal hypothetical. In
contrast, the large number of crimes and victims would lead the court to find
a pattern in the civil hypothetical. The Feltner court found a pattern with
nineteen victims and nine crimes, while the civil hypothetical involves fifty
victims and two hundred criminal acts. If the court considered significant
the number of defendants, the result might be different because only one
defendant is involved in the civil case.
128. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
129. Feltner, 879 F.2d at 1298-99. In Feltner, nineteen plaintiffs entered into contracts to
purchase nontheatrical distributorship rights in twenty-three films and television episodes.
Supposedly, these rights would produce income and provide significant tax advantages. When
the enterprise failed because of the poor quality of plaintiffs' copies and because numerous
unauthorized copies were on the market, plaintiffs brought this fraud action against five de-
fendants involved in the transaction. Id at 1292-94.
130. Id. at 1298. While implicitly accepting the factors mentioned by the Third and Sev-
enth Circuits, the court neither made reference to the similarity of the acts nor to the character
of the activity, both of which are Third Circuit factors. Furthermore, the court did not refer to
the number of distinct injuries, a Seventh Circuit factor. Id Nor was the court attempting to
formulate a list based upon these factors alone, for the court considered the number of perpe-
trators in the presence of separate schemes. Id Neither the Third nor the Seventh Circuit
considered this factor in their respective tests.
131. Although the actual fraud only lasted several months, the court apparently believed
that duration should be measured by the length of the intended relationship between the par-
ties--ten years. Id
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4. Continuity and Relationship as Applied by the Tenth, Ninth, and
Second Circuits
Even before HJ Inc., the Tenth, Ninth, and Second Circuits employed
the two-pronged Sedima test in analyzing RICO's pattern requirement.
132
Within the parameters of this two-part analysis, however, the three courts
interpreted "pattern" in radically different ways, based upon their under-
standing of the term "continuity."
a. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit's test for finding a pattern of racketeering appears to be
more liberal than the foregoing tests because it requires only something be-
yond a single scheme. In Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick 133 a corporation sued
three of its former directors for self-dealing in connection with the acquisi-
tion of another corporation, Denver Business Center (DBC).134 Employing
Sedima's two-part analysis, the Torwest court found that a relationship ex-
isted among "numerous" predicate acts because they all related to the same
scheme. 135 To satisfy the continuity prong, the court required some evi-
dence beyond a single scheme. 136 Relying on precedent,137 the court implied
that continuity could be shown in a number of ways: by evidence of multiple
schemes, an ongoing scheme, or multiple victims and frauds. 135 In Torwest,
however, the Tenth Circuit found none of these elements.' 39 There could be
132. This connection differentiates these circuits from the Third and Seventh Circuits,
which analyzed pattern generally, and from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which only con-
sidered factors that indicate an interrelationship between acts.
133. 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987).
134. Id. at 927. According to the complaint, the defendants had secretly formed Canusa
Investments Ltd. for the purpose of buying DBC and selling it to Torwest at a profit. Using
"nominees" to carry out the plan, the three directors, through Canusa, bought DBC for $5.4
million and then sold it to Torwest for $12.7 million. Id
135. Id. at 928.
136. Id. at 929. The court stated that "a scheme to achieve a single discrete objective does
not in and of itself create a threat of ongoing activity, even when that goal is pursued by
multiple illegal acts, because the scheme ends when the purpose is accomplished." Id.
137. Id. at 928-29 (citing Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 976 (7th Cir. 1986);
Lipin Enters. Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785
F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986)).
138. Id
139. Id. The court stated the "single scheme at issue involved one victim, Torwest DBC,
and had a single goal, the recovery of secret profit through self-dealing in the sale of the DBC."
Id; see also Edwards v. First Nat'l Bank, 872 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1989) (upholding the district




no threat of continuing criminal activity because the scheme would end once
the perpetrators achieved their objective."4°
Under this interpretation of continuity, neither of the hypotheticals would
demonstrate a RICO pattern to the Tenth Circuit. The criminal case would
not meet the court's requirements because it involved only one scheme with
one goal. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit would probably not find the requisite
continuity in the civil hypothetical. There were neither multiple schemes
nor one ongoing scheme, but only "a scheme to achieve a single discrete
objective."'' Moreover, the numerosity of the acts would probably not
matter because the Torwest court acknowledged the presence of "numerous"
criminal acts in that case, but did not mention this factor in its analysis.' 42
The outcome might be altered, however, should the number of victims be-
come large enough. The court did mention the number of victims as a possi-
ble way of establishing continuity.'43 Whether fifty victims would be a large
enough number to find continuity, and how much weight that one factor
would receive, is unclear.
b. The Ninth Circuit
Prior to the decision in HJ. Inc., the Ninth Circuit regarded continuity
and relationship as relevant considerations, not as "a determinative two-pro-
nged test."'" Similar to the Second and Tenth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit
did not find the relationship component to be problematic in most circum-
stances, but it struggled over continuity."' The Ninth Circuit did not enun-
ciate a multi-factor test to guide its analysis, but instead considered whether
the criminal acts were isolated or sporadic and thus not continuous."
In practice, however, the number of acts, the number of victims, and the
term of the criminal operation have determined whether the activity is suffi-
ciently continuous. In United Energy Owners Commission v. United Energy
Management Systems, 147 the marketers, promoters, and purchasers of solar
equipment sued the company that had contracted to install and maintain the
equipment. The plaintiffs alleged that between May 1984 and August 1985,




144. Sun Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 192 (9th Cir. 1987).
145. See, e.g., United Energy Owners Comm., Inc. v. United States Energy Management
Sys., Inc., 837 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing the various components of the "continuity
requirement").
146. Id. at 360. This focus led the court to reject any requirement of multiple schemes or
multiple episodes, which it viewed the Seventh and Tenth Circuits as requiring.
147. 837 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1988).
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United Energy Management made numerous misrepresentations relating to
their expertise, their intention to perform, and their progress. 148 In revers-
ing the lower court, the Ninth Circuit found that the "multiple fraudulent
acts involving multiple victims" were sufficiently related and posed a "suffi-
cient threat of continuing activity."' 49 In another Ninth Circuit case, the
court of appeals found that a single fraudulent inducement involving a single
victim did not establish a pattern.150 Thus, these three factors-the number
of victims, the number of acts, and the duration of the scheme-weigh most
heavily in the Ninth Circuit's analysis.
If the court applied these three factors to the criminal hypothetical, it
probably would not find a pattern of racketeering. Because the two murders
were simultaneous, the scheme could not involve a shorter period. Further,
there were only two acts of racketeering and only two victims. The Ninth
Circuit has never considered the character of the crime as a relevant factor,
as the Third Circuit has done. Therefore, the fact that two people were mur-
dered, rather than merely defrauded, would presumably be irrelevant. The
distributorship hypothetical, however, would produce a different result
under the Ninth Circuit's analysis; a single scheme involving two hundred
acts of fraud with fifty victims would amount to a pattern of racketeering.15 1
c. The Second Circuit
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in HJ. Inc., the Second Circuit in
United States v. Indelicato 152 and Beauford v. Helmsley'3 scrapped the pat-
tern test it had employed since 1980.114 Rather than requiring merely two
148. Id. at 359.
149. Id. at 361.
150. See California Architectural Bldg. Prod., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d
1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1987) (a "single fraud perpetrated on a single victim" does not amount to
a pattern of racketeering) (citing Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d
1393, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988).
151. See id at 1469. There, the court held that twenty-four acts of mail fraud in connec-
tion with a fraud upon several companies would satisfy the pattern requirement. The short life
of that scheme, covering only five months, would be comparable to the time during which the
distributorship offers were available.
152. 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 56 (1989).
153. 865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir.), vacated, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
154. Before these cases were decided, the Second Circuit followed the test it had first enun-
ciated in United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
In Weisman, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that a RICO pattern required the predi-
cate acts to be "'related' to each other through a 'common scheme, plan or motive.'" Idr at
1121. The court stated that a pattern could be proved through a showing of some connection
between the acts and the affairs of the enterprise. Id The Weiman court also considered
factors including adopting bylaws, securing counsel, hiring employees, establishing offices, and
seeking loans to determine if an enterprise existed. Id. at 1125. In addition, the "enterprise"
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acts, the court began to demand that plaintiffs demonstrate a relationship
between the acts and the threat of continuing violations, as Sedima sug-
gested.'" The Second Circuit also listed a number of factors necessary for
the relationship, but the court was vague about the meaning of continuity. 56
In Indelicato, a criminal prosecution for a multiple murder, and in
Beauford, a civil mail fraud case, the Second Circuit employed this new anal-
ysis. Indeicato involved the prosecution of a "soldier" in the Bonanno crim-
inal organization for the murder of boss Carmine Galante and the
simultaneous murder of two other gang members. 57 The defendant com-
mitted the murders at the direction of "the Commission," La Cosa Nostra,
which hoped to bring stability to the Bonanno family by removing Galante.
The only predicate acts charged in the indictment were the three murders. 58
After rejecting previous interpretations of pattern, the Second Circuit enu-
merated the factors that would demonstrate a relationship among the predi-
cate acts."5 9 "These include[d] proof of their temporal proximity, or
secured "procurement of additional funds through the 1973 public offering." Id. These fac-
tors plus the securities and bankruptcy fraud counts established the necessary relationship.
See United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 191-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006
(1987) (where the enterprise's single purpose "was to skim profits and had no obvious termi-
nating goal or date" which clearly established the "enterprise" requirement).
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, the Second Circuit reaffirmed this inter-
pretation in Janniello, explicitly stating that the court should apply the continuity and relation-
ship prongs of the Sedima test to the enterprise requirement. The court said: "[We hold that
when a person commits at least two acts that have the common purpose of furthering a contin-
uing criminal enterprise with which that person is associated, the elements of relatedness and
continuity which the Sedima footnote construes section 1962(c) to include are satisfied." Id at
192.
Thus, a pattern of racketeering could be proved by two acts of racketeering activity, an
extremely easy hurdle to overcome. The more difficult obstacle was demonstrating the exist-
ence of a RICO enterprise, which could not be established "unless there [was] proof that it
[was] ongoing and that there [was] more than a single scheme having no demonstrable ending
point." Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1381 (discussing the court's past precedent). The effect of this
interpretation was that a criminal RICO prosecution was generally successful, at least where
organized crime was involved. Nevertheless, because private suits usually involved limited
schemes with specific goals, these seldom met the stringent enterprise requirement. See, e.g.,
Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1987) (dismissed because of
limited scope of the scheme), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988); Albany Insurance Co. v.
Esses, 831 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1987)
(same). Contra United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1987) (conviction reversed
because there was no continuing criminal enterprise), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043 (1988).
155. Beauford, 865 F.2d at 1390-91; Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1381.
156. Beauford, 865 F.2d at 1392-93 (court listed separately indictable acts, interrelated
acts, and common goals); Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1382-83 (court listed temporal proximity of
the acts, common goals, similarity of methods, and repetitions).
157. Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1372.
158. Id
159. Id at 1381.
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common goals, or similarity of methods, or repetitions. '' "6 In addition, the
court relied on the definition of pattern as developed under the Dangerous
Special Offenders Act. 6 ' Although proof of relationship was not limited to
these factors, their presence indicates a connection between the acts.
162
When the Second Circuit applied this relationship test in Indelicato, it only
mentioned the similarity of purpose-the change in leadership in the
Bonanno family.163 Several other factors link the acts as well, however, such
as the temporal proximity of the crimes and the similar methods of
commission.'64
Although the three murders were clearly related, the court held that they
alone did not demonstrate the requisite continuity. 65 The Second Circuit
recognized a tension between the two elements, at least where the relation-
ship is proved by temporal proximity.1 66 This failure, however, did not
doom the government's case. Without specifying the limitations on this test,
the court held that certain factors external to the acts themselves could estab-
lish continuity or the threat of continuity. 167 In this case, the court held that
the threat of continuity came from the nature of the "enterprise" itself, a
criminal organization whose business is racketeering activity. 16 ' Even
though the acts were simultaneous, their relation to an ongoing criminal
enterprise provided the necessary continuity.
Although the new RICO analysis made little difference in Indelicato, 169
this relaxed test caused a reversal in the companion civil case, Beauford v.
Helmsley. 70 In Beauford, tenants of a New York apartment building al-
leged various acts of mail fraud in connection with the conversion of their
160. Id. at 1382.
161. Id. "[C]riminal conduct would form a pattern if it embraced criminal acts that had,
for example, 'the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of com-
mission.'" Id.
162. Id. at 1382-83.
163. Id. at 1384.
164. Id. at 1382.
165. Id. at 1384-85.
166. Id. at 1383. "[O]bviously the shorter the elapsed time between the two acts, the less it
can be said that the activity is continuing." Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1384. "Where the enterprise is an entity whose business is racketeering activity,
an act performed in furtherance of that business automatically carries with it the threat of
continued racketeering activity." Id. at 1384-85.
169. Because continuity may be proved by the presence of a continuing enterprise under
the Second Circuit's analysis, it appears that the Indelicato test is similar to the Weismani
lanniello test where organized crime is involved. See Note, RICO's "Pattern" Requirement
Void for Vagueness?, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 498-99 (1990).
170. 865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir.), vacated, 492 U.S. 914 (1989). The Supreme Court vacated
and remanded the case for further consideration in light of HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
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apartments into condominiums.' 7' Reversing its earlier Indelicato-analysis
holding, an en banc Second Circuit held that the tenants' complaint alleged a
RICO pattern.
72
The Beauford court found that the acts of mail fraud were related because
all the letters were sent to present and potential tenants and all the frauds
had the same goal. 173 In searching for the threat of continuity, the Second
Circuit considered "external" factors. Although the nature of the enterprise
did not pose such a threat, similar to Indelicato, the Second Circuit found
that the multiplicity of mailings and the probability of future mailings
demonstrated continuity. 74 The latter factor comports with a narrow con-
tinuity "test" because previous condominium conversions of other sections
of the same apartment complex involved multiple solicitations. Neverthe-
less, the first factor, the number of mailings, is consistent only with a loose
interpretation of continuity. A multiplicity of simultaneous events does not
seem to indicate that the events will continue.1
75
When applied to the two hypotheticals, these liberal standards would find
patterns of racketeering in both cases. Because Indelicato found continuity
in the organized crime commission, and not in any factors connected with
the murders, the fewer number of victims, acts and perpetrators in the hypo-
thetical would be irrelevant. In both cases, the purpose for the crimes
originated in an ongoing criminal enterprise. Given the expansive language
in Beauford, the court would probably find continuity in the civil hypotheti-
cal also, although the company's decision to terminate the offer makes the
case more difficult. The two hundred offers in the hypothetical are no more
isolated or sporadic than the eight thousand fraudulent offers in Beauford.
171. Beauford, 865 F.2d at 1388. The complaint charged that both the real estate com-
pany, which owned the apartment, and the engineering firm in charge of the conversion made
certain misstatements and omissions about the building's condition in the offering plans sent to
tenants. Id.
172. Id at 1389. In an earlier decision, a panel of the Second Circuit held that the com-
plaint did not demonstrate the necessary continuity to prove an enterprise. The panel said that
proof of only one scheme/episode would not meet this requirement. See Beauford v. Helms-
ley, 843 F.2d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1988).
173. Beauford, 865 F.2d at 1392.
174. Id
175. The Second Circuit's answer to this criticism is apparently based on its understanding
of Sedima. According to the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court did not establish continuity
and relationship as a rigid test in Sedima but merely wanted to indicate that "isolated" and
"sporadic" acts would not form a pattern. See United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370,
1375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 56 (1989). The Second Circuit stated that the "[United
States] Supreme Court does not enshrine 'continuity plus relationship' as a determinative two-
pronged test." Id. at 1383. Thus, in arguing that over 8,000 acts of mail fraud were clearly
not isolated or sporadic, the court never actually required continuity, but only required an
absence of "isolation."
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Assuming the court focused on the large number, rather than the potential
for similar acts, these multiple acts of mail fraud would constitute a pattern
of racketeering.
5. Multiple Acts Plus Continuity as Applied by the Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit has examined the phrase "pattern of racketeering"
on two occasions, both prior to the Supreme Court's decision in HJ. Inc. 176
In Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association v. Touche Ross &
Co., 177 five banks loaned International Horizons Corporation $60 million
based on financial statements audited by Touche Ross. When Horizons later
filed for bankruptcy, leaving the banks with a $16 million loss, they sued
Touche Ross.17 The plaintiffs alleged that over a three-year period, the ac-
counting firm committed nine separate acts of mail and wire fraud to induce
the banks to extend Horizons additional credit.
179
Although the Eleventh Circuit stated that a single scheme could satisfy
the RICO pattern requirement,180 the court noted that under its interpreta-
tion of Sedima, there must be "a showing of more than one racketeering
activity and the threat of continuing activity."' 81 Even though such a threat
was found in both cases, neither Bank of America nor the more recent case
of Durham v. Business Management Associates 18 2 defined the threat of con-
tinuity in any detail. In each case, the court merely quoted from the defini-
tion of pattern given in the Dangerous Special Offender Act (DSO).18 3
Without linking these particular factors to the defendant's conduct, the
176. In both Durham v. Business Management Associates. 847 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1988),
and Bank ofAmerica National Trust & Savings Association v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966
(11 th Cir. 1986), the court's discussion was rather abbreviated. Consequently, it is difficult to
determine the exact contours of the Eleventh Circuit's test. Nevertheless, the fundamental
requirement is "a showing of more than one racketeering activity and the threat of continuing
activity." Bank of America, 782 F.2d at 971.
177. 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986).
178. Id. 968.
179. Id. at 971.
180. By directly addressing the question of whether multiple schemes or transactions were
required to prove a pattern, the court implicitly acknowledged that only one scheme or trans-
action was present. The court's holding made clear that such a finding would not defeat a
complaint of a RICO violation stating that "[a]cts that are part of the same scheme or transac-
tion can qualify as distinct predicate acts." Id.
181. Id.
182. 847 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1988).
183. Bank of America, 782 F.2d at 971; see also Durham, 847 F.2d at 1511 (definition of
pattern stated with little discussion). Under the DSO, "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it
embraces criminal acts with the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission." Dangerous Special Offender Act 18 U.S.C. § 3575(c)(3) (1982) (re-
pealed 1984), construed in Bank of America, 782 F.2d at 971.
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Bank of America court held that "nine separate acts of wire and mail fraud,
involving the same parties over a period of three years," conducted for a
common purpose, would satisfy the pattern requirement.'"
The Eleventh Circuit is distinguished from other circuit courts by its ap-
plication of factors that normally demonstrate relationship to continuity."8 5
Under Sedima and HJ. Inc., the factors listed in the DSO definition are
pertinent to determine whether the acts are sufficiently related.18 6 The Elev-
enth Circuit has never discussed relationship; it has simply applied the DSO
factors to the continuity question after finding multiple acts. Given the ease
of finding these factors, 87 the result is an extremely flexible pattern require-
ment. Moreover, it appears that plaintiffs need only prove more than one
racketeering activity and the threat of continuing activity. Therefore, factors
such as an ongoing enterprise, the likelihood of future violations, or multiple
"transactions" are not addressed.
Under the Bank of America and Durham decisions, crimes in the civil
hypothetical would form a pattern. In the hypothetical, there were two hun-
dred acts of mail fraud directed toward a common goal. Further, the same
individuals perpetrated all two hundred crimes and employed the same
method. It is unclear, however, whether the Eleventh Circuit would find a
pattern under the facts of the criminal hypothetical. Although the crimes
were virtually identical in method and were directed toward the same goal,
they were few in number and virtually simultaneous. Given the sparse pre-
cedent in the Eleventh Circuit, it would be impossible to predict the court's
decision.
6. Relationship as Applied by the Fifth Circuit
Soon after the Sedima decision, the Fifth Circuit decided to address the
pattern issue by considering only the relationship between, or among, the
predicate acts. In R.A. G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 18 a corporation alleged
that its former president committed fraud by submitting false invoices to the
corporation. 8 9 The only basis for the RICO claim was the defendant's use
184. Bank of America, 782 F.2d at 971.
185. Ironically, the Eleventh Circuit test, which never mentions relationship, mirrors the
Fifth Circuit's test, which never discusses continuity. See infra notes 188-91 and accompany-
ing text.
186. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985); H.J. Inc. v. Northwest-
em Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240 (1989).
187. In H.J. Inc., the Supreme Court implied that it was relatively easy to find the DSO
factors present. 492 U.S. at 251 (Scalia, J., concurring).
188. 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985).
189. Id at 1351-52.
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of the mails on two occasions." 9° In holding that these acts formed a pat-
tern, the court did not mention continuity. Instead, it found that the acts of
mail fraud were not isolated, but related. 9' Although another Fifth Circuit
panel questioned the wisdom of the R.A.G.S. Couture decision even before
H.J. Inc.,' 92 the R.A.G.S. Couture analysis of pattern still is controlling.' 93
Given this liberal test, it appears certain that the Fifth Circuit would find a
pattern of racketeering in both the civil and the criminal hypotheticals.
C. Developments in the Circuit Courts Since H.J. Inc.
In the years since the Supreme Court decided HJ Inc., the complexion of
RICO's pattern requirement has changed only slightly. Neither the Sixth,
Ninth, nor Tenth Circuit has addressed the interpretation of pattern, leaving
intact the disparate pre-H. Inc. interpretations.'94 While the Eleventh Cir-
cuit has begun to discuss the pattern requirement in terms of relationship
and continuity,' 95 H.J Inc. seems to have had very little effect on the court's
perspective.
The Eleventh Circuit continues to take a broad view of pattern. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Hobson, '96 the court upheld the defendant's RICO
conviction, finding that a single crime which simultaneously violated two
statutes could satisfy the pattern requirement. 197 In the case, the defendant
was found guilty of aiding and abetting the importation and possession of
190. Id. at 1354.
191. Id. at 1355.
192. See Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cit. 1987)
(although this panel followed the decision, it encouraged that the decision be overturned en
banc).
193. See Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1129 (5th Cir. 1988).
194. Both the Ninth and the Sixth Circuits have made indirect references to H.J. Inc., even
though they have not specifically addressed the meaning of the pattern requirement. In United
States v. Walgren, 885 F.2d 1417, 1424-26 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit addressed the
related question of whether a single act that violates two criminal statutes can be a "pattern of
racketeering." In its discussion, the court cited the pre-H.J. Inc. cases of California Architec-
tural Bldg. Products, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988), and Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv- Well Furniture Co., 806
F.2d 1393 (9th cir. 1986), thereby indicating these cases were unaffected by the Supreme
Court's decision. Walgren, 885 F.2d at 1425 n. 11.
In Newmyer v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 888 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
2169 (1990), the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a RICO claim where the district court
had applied the Eighth Circuit's multi-scheme analysis. Id. at 396-98. Beyond this obvious
position, however, the court did not indicate its present understanding of the pattern require-
ment. Id.
195. See United States v. Hobson, 893 F.2d 1267 (1 1th Cir. 1990); United States v. Alexan-
der, 888 F.2d 777 (11th Cir. 1989).
196. 893 F.2d 1267 (11th Cir. 1990).
197. Id. at 1268-69.
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marijuana. On appeal, Hobson argued that his only act, making a 1.5 mil-
lion dollar advance for a load of marijuana, did not demonstrate the requi-
site continuity.' 98 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument, although it
engaged in no more analysis than in its earlier decisions. 199 Focusing upon
Hobson's participation as an organizer and his demand for repayment when
the transaction fell through, the Court stated: "The facts described above
... did not involve merely a single isolated act of paying money but rather a
series of acts, including a demand for repayment of a large sum of money or
delivery of marijuana to replace the load lost. ''2°° Apparently the Court
believed that this "series of acts" demonstrated continuity, and the demand
for replacement marijuana " 'project[ed] into the future with a threat of rep-
etition.' "20 In practice, the Eleventh Circuit has continued to apply an
extremely liberal pattern test. Here, an individual was convicted of the mini-
mum number of acts, the acts were actually one act which violated two stat-
utes, and he was not even a primary defendant but only an aider and abettor.
The Second Circuit similarly appears to have retained the broad interpre-
tation of pattern it articulated in Indelicato and Beauford. 2 2 Relationship
may still be tested by referring to the DSO list of factors. Continuity is
tested by referring to the duration of the scheme.203 Moreover, the Second
Circuit allows the continuity element to be proved by evidence of many
crimes occurring over a short period.2 "4 Even though the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded Beauford, where the Second Circuit used the number
of acts to support a finding of continuity, the circuit upheld its earlier deci-
sion.2"' Given the flexibility of the Second Circuit's test and the Supreme
Court's test,2°6 it is not surprising that district court decisions lack
uniformity.
207
The Eighth Circuit has reexamined the pattern requirement, having had
its multiple-scheme test struck down in H.J. Inc. The Eighth Circuit first
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1269.
201. Id. (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 241 (1989)).
202. See United States v. Kaplan, 886 F.2d 536, 542-43 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30, 41 (2d Cir. 1989).
203. Jacobson v. Cooper, 882 F.2d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at
240).
204. Id
205. Beauford v. Helmsley, 893 F.2d 1433 (2d Cir. 1989).
206. Both Justice Scalia and subsequent appellate courts have criticized the H.J. Inc. con-
tinuity and relationship test for being extremely malleable. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 251-56
(Scalia, J., concurring); Management Computer Servs. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 883
F.2d 48, 51 (7th Cir. 1989).
207. Note, supra note 169, at 504.
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applied the Supreme Court's test in Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Financial
Co., 0 a case involving fraud in the financing and construction of two resi-
dential subdivisions. The plaintiff subcontractors alleged that a seller of
land, a lender, and a general contractor devised a scheme to defraud the
plaintiffs'out of labor and materials on the two separate projects. 2°9 The
court had little trouble finding a relationship among the acts, noting that
four of the five specific DSO considerations were present. 210 Though the
Eighth Circuit found the continuity prong difficult to define, it held that the
duration of the two fraudulent schemes established sufficient evidence of
continuity.21
The Eighth Circuit then discussed the presence of multiple criminal
schemes involving different subdivisions, different victim subcontractors,
and "wholly separate and distinct" periods of construction.212 While recog-
nizing that multiple schemes could no longer be the dispositive factor in its
pattern analysis, the Eighth Circuit nevertheless considered multiple
schemes based upon the Supreme Court's flexible language. 213 Thus, in At-
las Pile Driving, the court probably would have found the test satisfied, even
under its previous multi-scheme test. It remains to be seen how the court
will weigh the multiple scheme factor in future cases.
Because its previous interpretation only asked if the predicate acts were
related, the Fifth Circuit also found it necessary to modify its pattern re-
quirement after H.J Inc. Soon after the Supreme Court's decision, the ap-
pellate court recognized that the decision had "narrowed the meaning of
'pattern,'" demanding the addition of a continuity prong. 214 But the court
did not analyze the new test in any detail until 1990 in Landry v. Air Line
Pilots Association, International, AFL-CIO. 2 5 Landry involved a suit by a
208. 886 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1989).
209. Id. at 988-89.
210. Id at 994.
211. In Atlas, the fraudulent acts were separated by one and three years. Id. at 994-95.
212. Id Notice in Atlas that the presence of different victims is one of the factors showing
separate schemes, and thus continuity, while similar victims is one of the factors in the DSO
relatedness test. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985). Consequently,
the fact that the victims were different may be used by the court, not against a finding of
relatedness, but for a finding of continuity.
213. Atlas, 886 F.2d at 994-95. The majority in HJ. Inc. first said a" 'scheme' is in the eye
of the beholder, since whether a scheme exists depends on the level of generality at which
criminal activity is viewed." They went on to say, however, that proof of involvement in
multiple schemes is "highly relevant" to the continuity inquiry. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240 (1989).
214. Smith v. Cooper/T. Smith Corp., 886 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1989). In Smith, this altera-
tion proved dispositive, for the plaintiffs ultimately admitted that they could not satisfy the
more rigorous H.J. Inc. test. Id at 756.
215. 901 F.2d 404, 432-33 (5th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 244 (1990).
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group of pilots in connection with an agreement between their employer and
their union allowing the airline to move its pilot base from Louisiana to El
Salvador.2 16
In applying the relationship prong of H.J Inc., the Fifth Circuit first cited
the DSO list of factors and then asked which of these factors were applicable
to Landry. Ultimately, the court found each one present, noting that "the
relationship element is easily satisfied here by the pilots' allegations., 217 As
to the continuity prong, the court found that the union and the union negoti-
ator might be held to present continuing threats of racketeering. With re-
spect to the union defendant, the court relied on a similar, but unrelated, suit
against the union by another group of pilots. Like the Landry pilots, these
plaintiffs alleged that the union "sold them out to protect itself from prose-
cution for the acts of sabotage it directed." 218 According to the court, the
presence of such an action could demonstrate continuity because the union
"pose[d] a threat of continuing harm to other victims. "219
Thus, like the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit will look beyond the acts
themselves to some other source of continuity-here, unproven allegations
in an unrelated proceeding. Given this willingness to find a threat of con-
tinuity, it is worth asking whether the addition of continuity as a considera-
tion will actually affect the court's decisions. The old liberal relationship test
may simply be wearing a new face.22°
216. Id. at 408. In their RICO action, the pilots alleged that the airline, the union, and the
union negotiator were attempting to accomplish four basic objectives---moving the pilot base,
ending the union's representation of the pilots, insuring the union negotiator received retire-
ment benefits and terminating the pilots' rights under the collective bargaining agreement. Id
at 425.
217. In applying the DSO factors, the court said:
First, all of the predicate acts were aimed at achieving a single goal-relocation of
the pilots' base to El Salvador. Only through the accomplishment of this goal could
all of the RICO defendants' subsidiary goals be accomplished. Second, we find the
participants were the same: ALPA [the union] and Huttinger [the union negotiator].
Third, the victims were the same: the pilots. Finally, the events are in no way iso-
lated, but are related in the sense that they all occurred or commenced during or
grew out of the process of negotiating TACA's relocation program.
Id. at 433.
218. Id at 426.
219. Id
220. But cf. Howell Hydrocarbons, Inc. v. Adams, 897 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1990). In
Howell, the court noted that a "single misrepresentation or fraudulent statement is not enough
to provide the continuity required for a pattern of racketeering. There has been no indication
of activities that amount to or threaten long term criminal activity." Id. at 193 (citing H.J.
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240 (1989)).
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Finally, the Third and Seventh Circuits have reexamined their pattern
tests in light of H.J. Inc. Both these circuits are multi-factor circuits.2 2" '
Given the importance of "scheme" in the Seventh Circuit's pre-HJ. Inc.
analysis, it is significant that the Supreme Court criticized the term
"scheme" as "highly elastic and amorphous." '22 2 The Seventh Circuit re-
sponded by removing "scheme" from its list of factors, suggesting that the
"presence of separate schemes" is no longer "useful in analyzing the pattern
element. '223 While the Eighth Circuit considers the presence of separate
schemes to be highly relevant in finding continuity, even if no longer deter-
minative under HJ. Inc.,224 the Seventh Circuit has stopped considering
schemes entirely. Instead, the Seventh Circuit uses three other factors from
the Morgan test that are consistent with the Supreme Court's general
guidelines.225
In Management Computer Services v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 226 the
Seventh Circuit did not find a pattern when it followed this altered formula.
Characterizing the case as "essentially a contract dispute," the court said
that a case involving one victim, one transaction between the parties, and
two predicate acts would not satisfy the pattern requirement.227 The Man-
agement Computer fraud was limited in scope, however, making it difficult
to determine where the court draws the line between a pattern of racketeer-
ing and "isolated" criminal activity.
In a limited fraud involving one victim and one injury, the Third Circuit
came to a somewhat different conclusion. In Swistock v. Jones,228 two indi-
vidual plaintiffs alleged that their lessors, two individual owners of property
and coal deposits, committed mail and wire fraud in inducing them to lease
221. Since H.J. Inc., the Sixth Circuit has addressed the pattern requirement only tangen-
tially. Citing the Supreme Court's opinion, the Sixth Circuit in Callanan v. United States, 881
F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1989), recognized that a purported pattern of racketeering would be suffi-
cient only if the predicate acts were both related and continuous. Id. at 234. Although the
issue in Callanan was whether the acts would meet even the minimal two-act requirement, the
court never discussed the meaning of these terms. Id. While nothing in H.J. Inc. would seem
to undercut a multi-factor approach, it remains to be seen whether the circuit will retain this
analytical method.
222. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241 n.3.
223. Management Computer Servs. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 883 F.2d 48, 51 (7th
Cir. 1989).
224. Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Financial Co., 886 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir. 1989).
225. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 977 (7th Cir. 1986). The court takes a
"natural and common sense approach" to pattern and focuses upon "long term" criminal
conduct. Id. at 976-77.
226. 883 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1989).
227. Id. at 51.
228. 884 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1989).
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the land.22 9 After employing the weighted six-factor test, the district court
concluded that "the single injury, single victim scheme alleged by plaintiffs
was legally insufficient to state a RICO pattern."23 In reversing the dismis-
sal, the Third Circuit broadly interpreted the allegations.231 According to
the court, the alleged acts of mail and wire fraud were for the same purpose;
therefore, the acts were related.2 32 Furthermore, dismissal was inappropri-
ate if the plaintiffs could prove continuity through any one of several
mechanisms.
233
The status of the six-factor test in the Third Circuit is unclear after Swis-
tock While some commentators have stated that the Swistock court retained
the test even after H.J. Inc.,234 a closer reading of the opinion suggests other-
wise. 2 35 The Third Circuit never explicitly rejected either the six-factor test
or any of its factors. 236 The court in Swistock held that the number of vic-
tims and the quantity of injury were no longer dispositive.2 37 The opinion
also indicated that two of the six factors-the length of the scheme and the
number of predicate acts-were relevant in determining whether continuity
229. Id at 756-57.
230. Id at 758.
231. Id The court said that "[a]lthough we also may have concluded in the pre-H.J. Inc.
period that plaintiffs pled at most a state law fraud case, we are now bound to give the allega-
tions a broader interpretation." Id
232. Id. at 759 (both acts were aimed at obtaining a lease).
233. Id For instance, because the predicate acts alleged by the plaintiffs occurred over the
course of more than a year, plaintiffs might be able to prove "the existence of a closed-end
period of repeated conduct of sufficient length" to indicate continuity. Id In the alternative,
the plaintiffs might be able to demonstrate a threat of continuity "'by showing that the predi-
cate acts . .. are part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business.'" Id. at 757
(quoting H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242 (1989)).
234. Note, supra note 169, at 500.
235. The Swistock court said: "The district court correctly identified long-term racketeer-
ing activity or the threat thereof as the touchstone of the continuity concept. The district
court, however, applied the six factor test which we had enunciated in Saporito v. Combustion
Engineering Inc., 843 F.2d 666, 676-77 (3rd Cir. 1988)." Swistock, 884 F.2d at 757. The use
of the word "however" suggests that this test may no longer be the guiding formula in the
Third Circuit. Further, the court emphasized a method of proving continuity which hereto-
fore had not been included in its analysis of the pattern requirement. Quoting from H.J. Inc.,
the court said that " 'a threat of continuity of racketeering activity might be established at trial
by showing that the alleged bribes were a regular way of conducting [the company's] ongoing
business.'" Id at 757 (quoting H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242). This consideration was not among
the six Saporito factors.
236. At least one other post-.. Inc. case also indicates that the six-factor test is not yet
dead. See Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1166 (3d Cir. 1989).
237. Swistock, 884 F.2d at 758.
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existed. 238 After Swistock, the meaning of pattern in the Third Circuit seems
more ambiguous than before.
2 39
These recent cases illustrate the amorphous nature of the Supreme Court's
two-part test and indicate that the courts are diverging in their interpreta-
tions of RICO's pattern requirement. 2' As the Seventh Circuit recently re-
ported, "we find [the Supreme Court's] explanations of the terms continuity
and relationship to be somewhat elastic."24 1 Without concrete guidance
from the statutory language, the legislative history, or even the Supreme
Court, circuit courts continue to differ in their application of the pattern
requirement.
III. THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
Under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments,
federal and state statutes must be reasonably clear, or they will be struck
down as unconstitutionally vague.24 2 The requirement of reasonable clarity
is based on two primary concerns. First, individuals should know what ac-
tivities are prohibited so they can conform their conduct to the law's require-
ments.24 3 It seems unfair to punish someone who could not ascertain that
his actions were prohibited. Second, law enforcement officials should be
238. Id.
239. In Marshall-Silver Construction Co. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990), the Third
Circuit raised the question of whether" 'continuity' is solely a 'temporal concept' " or whether
the extent of the criminal activity is relevant. Id. at 596-97. This new dispute over continuity
is but further proof that H.J. Inc. generated as much ambiguity as it cured.
240. Note, supra note 169, at 504.
241. Management Computer Servs. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 883 F.2d 48, 51 (7th
Cir. 1989) (citing H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 252-56 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring)).
242. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. As the Supreme Court stated in Connally v. General
Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), the classic formulation of the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine, "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law." Id. at 391; see TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 12-31, 1033-35 (1988) (general discussions of the void-for-vagueness doctrine);
Comment, Reconciliation of Conflicting Void-for- Vagueness Theories Applied by the Supreme
Court. 9 Hous. L. REV. 82 (1971) (same); Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960) (same); Note, Big Mama Rag: An Inquiry Into
Vagueness, 67 VA. L. REv. 1523 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Big Mama Rag] (same).
243. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Cramp v. Board of Pub. In-
struction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961); Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.
1985); Levas & Levas v. Village of Antioch, Ill., 684 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1982); see R. RO-
TUNDA, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, § 20.9, at 34-37
(1986) (notice must be given so that the public can distinguish between criminal activity and
an activity that relates to a fundamental constitional right); Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and
the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189 (1985).
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given guidance in enforcing statutes. 2' Absent such guidance, those
charged with enforcing the statute may act arbitrarily or discriminatorily in
enforcing statutes.
These concerns are balanced against the need for broad and flexible stat-
utes to cover the multiplicity of criminal situations that may arise. Conse-
quently, courts rarely declare statutes "facially vague," which would imply
that the statutes' requirements are so uncertain that they provide no stan-
dards. The effect of such a decision would render the entire statute unconsti-
tutional."43 A reviewing court, however, may hold a law partially vague,
which implies that the statute is unclear as applied to the defendant's behav-
ior. If a court finds a law partially vague, the law cannot be applied to that
particular defendant, but it remains intact. In these cases, the court often
finds a "cure" for the deficiency-either a judicial interpretation of the stat-
ute which sufficiently narrows its meaning, or a scienter requirement which
assures that the defendant knew that his conduct was prohibited. As a result
of these limitations, courts seldom reverse legislative enactments using the
void-for-vagueness doctrine. 246
A. Purposes Behind the Requirement of Definiteness
Although the Supreme Court recently mentioned four policies behind
prohibiting vague statutes, courts historically have addressed only two con-
cerns-warning to potential defendants2"7 and guidance for law enforcement
officials.2 8 It is unfair to punish an individual who has not been fairly
244. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162, 168-71; Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614
(1971); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966); Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 838
(1st Cir. 1985); R. ROTUNDA, supra note 243, at 35.
245. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394-401 (1979); United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 434-46 (1978); Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971).
246. See United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957); Boyce
Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ander-
son, 749 F.2d 663 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
247. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982). In
Village of Hoffman Estates; one of two recent decisions analyzing the vagueness doctrine in
some detail, Justice Marshall reiterated these policies and stated that "because we assume that
man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly." Id. at 498 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
248. Although most Supreme Court opinions dealing with vagueness have focused on these
concerns, Justice Brennan has mentioned two other reasons to invalidate indefinite statutes. In
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 US. 609 (1984), Justice Brennan said a requirement of
reasonable clarity "ensures that state power will be exercised only on behalf of policies reflect-
ing an authoritative choice among competing social values... and permits meaningful judicial
review." Id. at 629.
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warned that particular actions are prohibited. Before being prosecuted for
violating a law, an individual should have the opportunity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of a statute. Where statutory language is so
ambiguous that a person cannot know what conduct is proscribed, he has
not been fairly warned.24
The language of a statute not only affects the conduct of potential defend-
ants, it also affects the decisions of those who enforce the law. A law en-
forcement official's decision to prosecute a particular defendant will depend
upon the defendant's actions and the official's understanding of the legal pro-
As in the enforcement sphere, effective judicial review is only possible if statutes are reason-
ably precise. If the statute is vague, the reviewing court has no standard against which to
evaluate the decision of a lower court. Without such a standard, the appellate court presuma-
bly is less likely to reverse the trial court, especially where the standard of review is something
other than de novo review. State v. Mays, 446 So. 2d 1195 (La. 1984). In other words, the
presumption in favor of a lower court's determination is strengthened by an imprecise law.
Assuming the appropriate standard of review is in place, the effect of increasing judicial defer-
ence will be the affirmance of some decisions that ordinarily would have been reversed.
This heightened deference also increases the probability that decisions influenced by im-
proper motives will be upheld. Reviewing courts themselves are presumably less likely to be
influenced by illegitimate factors, at least in part because the review is usually confined to the
record. Fineberg v. Niekerk, 175 Cal. App. 3d 935, 221 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1985); B/M Redev.
Corp. v. Serrano, 3 Conn. App. 409, 488 A.2d 848 (1985). Where a statute is so vague that the
appellate court cannot be sure whether certain behavior comes within its proscriptions, it may
be less obvious that prosecutors and juries are acting arbitrarily or discriminatorily. Only
sufficiently definite statutes will ensure that such judicial review is meaningful. Roberts, 468
U.S. at 629; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 564, 575 (1976); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,
221 (1876).
Where a law is so vague that neither policemen, prosecutors, nor juries understand the par-
ticular statutory requirements, state power may be exercised on behalf of policies different
from those the legislature intended. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 151-52 (1945) (Mur-
phy, J., dissenting). Cf Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 261 (1937); United States v. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 92 (1921). Even if the enforcement officials do not discriminate and
even if they act consistently, they may be supporting policies that contravene the legislature's
intentions. For example, although the legislative goal of RICO unquestionably was the de-
struction of organized crime, the imprecision of the statutory language allows prosecutors to
use it against ordinary corporate fraud. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499
(1985); Saporito v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 843 F.2d 666, 678 (3d Cir. 1988); Barticheck v.
Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 40 (3d Cir. 1987); Masi v. Ford City Bank
and Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 1985). Only reasonable clarity will insure that
enforcers use state power to further policies that the legislature supports.
249. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498; see also Goguen, 425 U.S. at 566 (Massa-
chusetts flag misuse statute held unconstitutionally vague because it failed to differentiate be-
tween ceremonial and nonceremonial treatment). But see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104 (1972) (antinoise ordinance held not to be unconstitutionally vague because the statu-
tory intent was aimed specifically toward the context of school activities). Vague laws are
inefficient as well as unconstitutional, assuming the goal is to prevent certain types of conduct.




scription.25° If a defendant's actions are similar to the description of a crime
given by a statute, government officials will prosecute and a jury will convict.
If the description of the prohibited behavior is excessively vague, however,
both prosecutors and triers of fact will be without any guidance.25' One
danger is that these officials will act arbitrarily, convicting one defendant
and acquitting another even though both are similarly situated. Even more
offensive to due process is the potential for discriminatory enforcement.
Without the guidance provided by clear statutory commands, officials may
"pursue their personal predilections."252 The Court recently has said that
curbing this danger of unbridled discretion is the most important aspect of
the vagueness doctrine.2" 3
B. Legislative and Judicial Difficulties
The Supreme Court has stated that "an enactment is void-for-vagueness if
its prohibitions are not clearly defined.",25 4 The statute must "give the per-
son of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is pro-
hibited."'25  This apparently simple requirement masks a number of
difficulties inherent in the legislative and judicial processes. Whenever the
legislature drafts a narrow statute, it "risk[s] nullification by easy evasion of
the legislative purpose., 256 Sometimes certain defendants will fall outside
the proscriptions of a statute because the legislature could not foresee, nor
did it have the time to provide for, the countless permutations that might
arise. 5 This intrinsic difficulty makes courts deferential to legislative enact-
ments, unless the statute implicates constitutional rights.258
The void-for-vagueness test also imposes problems for reviewing courts.
Part of the difficulty arises because the indefiniteness of language259 requires
250. See Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules" On Acoustic Separation in Crimi-
nal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1984).
251. In Village of Hoffman Estates Justice Marshall described the risk in such a situation:
"A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and dis-
criminatory applications." 455 U.S. at 498.
252. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575 (cited in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 259 (1983)).
253. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 359.
254. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
255. Id.
256. TRiBE, supra note 242, at 1033 (citing Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 107 (1972);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
257. Of course, Congress could draft the statute to cover almost every conceivable situa-
tion, as it has codified the Internal Revenue Code.
258. See infra notes 262-301 and accompanying text.
259. As one commentator has noted: "There is no sharp line between language which is
uncertain and language which is certain. What is uncertain at one time may be certain at
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courts to evaluate a statute's vagueness in light of particular circumstances.
Otherwise, judges would be relying solely on their subjective determinations
of a statute's clarity. This realization, in addition to the knowledge judges
have of the difficulties inherent in drafting statutes, may contribute to their
unwillingness to strike statutes in toto. Making decisions based on particular
circumstances, however, precludes the development of systematic rules of
decision to guide later analysis. Thus, Supreme Court decisions are not de-
void of informed reasoning, as certain commentators have suggested."W
Rather, the nature of the subject makes it more difficult to develop the gen-
eral formulations needed to decide later cases. Whatever the reason, though,
the void-for-vagueness doctrine's statements of purpose, to warn potential
defendants and guide enforcement officials,26 1 are of little help in analyzing
specific statutes.
C. Facial and Partial Challenges to Vague Statutes
Courts addressing vagueness challenges face an unenviable task: to strike
a balance in protecting defendants and guiding criminal enforcement, while
allowing sufficient flexibility to make the statute viable. A similar conflict
exists whenever someone challenges a statute under a clause of the United
States Constitution. Regardless of whether a litigant challenges a statute
under the free exercise clause, the free speech clause, or the due process
clause, the reviewing court must consider the interests of the individual as
well as the societal concern which motivated the legislation. The Supreme
Court handles this tension, in part, by distinguishing between facial and par-
tial challenges to a law.
According to the Supreme Court, in a facial attack on a statute the de-
fendant "must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid." '26 2 If the facial challenge is based on the due process
clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendments, the defendant must argue that
the statutory language is so unclear that it establishes no standard at all.263
another." Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 195
(1955).
260. See, e.g., Note, Big Mama Rag, supra note 242, at 1543.
261. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 394 (1926); see also supra note 242
(discussing vague statutes and due process).
262. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (rejecting a facial attack upon the
Bail Reform Act under the eighth amendment).
263. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 n.7
(1982) (citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)); see also United States v.
Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (declaring facially vague a statute that prohibited
making an "unjust or unreasonable rate").
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In other words, no "hard core" of conduct is prohibited.2 Except in cer-
tain limited situations,2 65 the Court will "uphold the [facial] challenge only
if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." 2 " An
example is the challenged statute in Coates v. City of Cincinnati.2 67  In
Coates, a municipal ordinance made it a crime for groups "to assemble...
on any of the sidewalks... [and to] conduct themselves in a manner annoy-
ing to persons passing by."'2 6 ' The Court invalidated the statute in toto be-
cause the statute did not establish any standard, and it provided no advance
guidance as to what conduct other persons would find annoying.
269
Although the Court will normally entertain a facial challenge only if the
statute is vague in all of its applications, the Court does not always require
the defendant to shoulder this heavy burden.27 ° In Kolender v. Lawson, the
Court reemphasized these exceptions in the context of a California vagrancy
statute.271 The statute required individuals to provide police officers with
"credible and reliable" identification if the officer had "reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity sufficient to justify a Terry [v. Ohio] detention.
272
Before evaluating the constitutionality of the statute, Justice O'Connor cited
two exceptions to the rule requiring a statute to be vague in all of its applica-
tions. First, where a statute implicates "'a substantial amount of constitu-
tionally protected conduct,'" such as the freedom of speech or movement, a
264. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974).
265. Where first amendment or other constitutional rights are implicated, the Supreme
Court will demand greater precision in statutory language. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 359 n.8 (1983) (court will "permit a facial challenge if a law reaches 'a substantial amount
of constitutionally protected conduct' ") (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494).
Like overbroad statutes, vague statutes may chill constitutionally protected activity because
"citizens [will] '"steer far wider of the unlawful zone" . . . than if the boundaries of the
forbidden areas were clearly marked.'" Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n.6 (quot-
ing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)). Where constitutionally protected conduct is
implicated or where discriminatory enforcement is a significant risk, the Court has not re-
quired that a statute be vague in all its possible applications. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358-59
n.8. In these situations of constitutionally protected conduct, a defendant may challenge the
statute on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth even if his own conduct is clearly proscribed.
See Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495.
266. Village of Hoffman Estates 455 U.S. at 495.
267. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
268. Id at 611 n.1.
269. Id at 614 n.4. But see Kolender, 461 U.S. at 370 (White, J., dissenting) ("The upshot
of our cases, therefore, is that whether or not a statute purports to regulate constitutionally
protected conduct, it should not be held unconstitutionally vague on its face unless it is vague
in all of its possible applications."). In Coates there were certainly situations in which conduct
would clearly fall within the statutory proscriptions, such as spitting on a passerby. Coates,
402 U.S. at 611.
270. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358-59 n.8.
271. Id. at 353.
272. Id at 356. (citing 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
1991]
Catholic University Law Review
facial challenge will be permitted even if certain behavior would unquestion-
ably come within the statute.2 3 Second, where a statute imposes criminal
penalties, "[tihis concern has, at times, led [the Court] to invalidate a crimi-
nal statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid
application. '274
In holding the vagrancy statute facially vague, Justice O'Connor focused
on the amount of discretion given to police officers under the statute, a con-
sideration which, prior to Kolender, had been subordinate to the notice given
a defendant.275 Letting individual policemen determine whether a suspect
has provided credible and reliable identification poses tremendous risks of
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Justice O'Connor believed that
the vague statute encouraged arbitrary enforcement because it did not ex-
plain what would qualify as credible and reliable identification.276 Based on
the decision in Kolender, the Court seemed more willing to entertain and to
sustain "facial challenges in the arbitrary enforcement context.
277
Although courts are less likely to declare a statute facially vague because
of a concern about arbitrary enforcement, they will frequently invalidate a
statute as applied. 27' Facial vagueness is distinguished from partial vague-
ness by the presence of "a hard core of circumstances to which the statute
unquestionably applies" and which the ordinary person would recognize.279
In contrast, if the court determines that a defendant's conduct falls outside
this definite area, it will only invalidate the law as applied to him; the court
will not discard the whole statute.280
In Palmer v. City of Euclid,21 the Supreme Court followed this procedure
in reversing a conviction under a "suspicious person ordinance. '28 2 The
273. Id. at 359 n.8 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)).
274. Id. (citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394-401 (1979); Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451 (1939)).
275. Justice O'Connor stated: "It is clear that the full discretion accorded to the police to
determine whether the suspect has provided a 'credible and reliable' identification necessarily
'entrust[s] lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat."' "
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (quoting Greg-
ory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 120 (1969) (Black, J., concurring))).
276. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360.
277. Id. at 359 n.8.
278. Collings, supra note 259, at 198; see, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
614 (1971) (statute, while encompassing conduct within city's power to prohibit, is unconstitu-
tionally vague because no standard of conduct is specified).
279. Collings, supra note 259, at 206.
280. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495
(1982).
281. 402 U.S. 544 (1971).
282. Id. at 544-45.
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statute, which prohibited individuals from being on the streets late at night
"without any visible or lawful business," was applied to a man who dis-
charged a female passenger and remained parked on the street. 2 3 Although
the Supreme Court declared the statute vague as applied to the defendant,
holding that he was not fairly warned that his conduct was punishable, the
Court did not invalidate the statute in toto. 21
4
D. Cures For Vagueness
Even if a statute is unconstitutionally vague standing alone, courts often
reject vagueness challenges if external factors appear to have "cured" the
problem. Frequently, judicial glosses applied by a state supreme court or by
a federal administrative agency provide enough definiteness to remedy a stat-
ute's vagueness. 283 For example, in Kolender, the Supreme Court accepted
the California Court of Appeals' interpretation of "credible and reliable"
identification. 2 6 Although the Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the
statute as construed, it reaffirmed the reviewing court's obligation to "'take
the statute as though it read precisely as the highest court of the State has
283. Id.
284. Id at 546.
285. Although judicial glosses by the highest court of a state and by a federal agency may
"cure" an otherwise vague statute, this policy cannot be extended to federal appellate courts,
as some commentators have erroneously assumed. See Note, supra note 169, at 510-12. State
supreme courts and federal agencies are the final interpreters of their respective bodies of
"law" because neither the Supreme Court nor any other institution has the authority to add its
own gloss upon these interpretations. Id A potential defendant can be assured that this inter-
pretation draws the precise line between permissible and impermissible conduct.
But federal appellate courts' decisions are only tentative, subject to immediate reversal
whether they "[converge] ... around a reasonably consistent concept" or not; therefore, these
decisions do not provide adequate guidance. Id at 511-12. Until the Supreme Court gives a
definitive interpretation to a statute, the defendant cannot be sure what a particular statute
means. See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 881 F.2d 229, 231 (6th Cir. 1989) (the court
retroactively applied the McNally rule, which provided a new interpretation of substantive
criminal law); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (Court repudiated intangible
rights theory in mail fraud cases, though this theory was "settled law ... in every circuit that
had considered the issue"). Therefore, even if the federal circuit courts were coming to some
sort of consensus about pattern of racketeering, this consensus could not "cure" the vagueness
of the term.
286. The Supreme Court determined that identification met this standard as long as the
identification " 'carr(ied] reasonable assurance that [it was] authentic and provid[ed] means for
later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself.'" 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983);
see People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 872 (1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 951 (1974) (court narrowly construed statute so that requiring identification was its
primary purpose, not requiring a person to account for his or her presence).
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interpreted it.' ,,287 In some cases, this judicial gloss has led the Supreme
Court to uphold the challenged statute.288
Where the gloss comes from a federal agency charged with enforcing a
statute and establishing regulations pursuant to that statute, the Court has
also been less willing to invalidate the law. In United States Civil Service
Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers,2"9 the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia found section 9(a) of the Hatch
Act facially vague.2' 9 Section 9(a) prohibited employees of Executive agen-
cies or the District of Columbia from "tak[ing] an active part in political
management or in political campaigns."'2 91 In reversing the lower court, the
Supreme Court held that the "more refined definition" elaborated by the
Civil Service Commission provided sufficient warning to potential defend-
ants.292 Moreover, individuals who were uncertain about the scope of a stat-
ute or rule could have requested a clarification from the Commission before
acting.293 At least superficially, these decisions are consistent with the un-
derlying purposes of the void-for-vagueness doctrine: judicial or administra-
tive interpretations establishing the contours of legislation must warn
potential defendants and guide enforcement officials.294
Requiring scienter in a statute will also cure statutory vagueness.2 95 The
local ordinance in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
287. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 356 n.4 (quoting Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22-23
(1973)).
288. See, e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953) (court looked to New
Hampshire Supreme Court interpretation in determining validity of state ordinance requiring
license for public meetings); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
289. 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (lower court's jury instructions defining state statute viewed as
binding in court as ruling on question of state law).
290. Id. at 553.
291. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1988).
292. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 575. Similarly, in Village of Hoffman
Estates, the Court did not consider the local ordinance alone, but reviewed the more narrow
guidelines which elaborated the licensing standard in greater detail. Village of Hoffman Es-
tates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 501-02 (1982).
293. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 580. In Village of Hoffman Estates,
Justice Marshall noted that in highly regulated areas, these complementary processes-elabo-
rating rules and opining as to possible violations-justified less scrutiny by courts. Village of
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498. Because businesses are generally the subjects of such regula-
tory systems, these potential defendants "[could] be expected to consult relevant legislation in
advance of action... [and] to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry, or by
resort to an administrative process." Id.
294. Of course, a question still arises regarding how far a defendant should be expected to
go in ferreting out the warning. In his dissent in NationalAssociation of Letter Carriers, Justice
Douglas focused upon the fact that the statute incorporated over 3,000 rulings of the Civil
Service Commission. 413 U.S. at 595-96.
295. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499-503.
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Inc. required store owners to obtain a license if they sold items "designed or
marketed for use" with illegal drugs.2 96 Although the Court struggled with
ambiguities inherent in the phrase "designed for use," it found a scienter
requirement implicit in the phrase "marketed for use.",2 9 7 The manager of
defendant Flipside was found to have the requisite intent to "market for use"
because a sign posted in his store read: "You must be 18 or older to
purchase any head supplies."' 298 Noting that "head" is slang for a frequent
drug user, the Court found that this action indicated the manager knew the
items were to be used with illegal drugs. 299 Although a number of critics
have ridiculed scienter as a cure for vagueness,3"o Village of Hoffman Estates
shows how such a requirement can insure "a correspondence between the
defendant's own cognitions and the description of the proscribed conduct in
the relevant conduct rule."3 1 If a defendant knows his conduct is pro-
scribed by statute, regardless of how it might apply to others, then he must
obey the law or face punishment for its violation.
IV. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS OF RICO's PATrERN
REQUIREMENT
Given the standard of clarity demanded of criminal statutes, RICO's pat-
tern requirement fails a due process inquiry. While unconstitutional vague-
ness can never be demonstrated deductively, 30 2 a number of circumstances
296. Id. at 491.
297. "[A] retailer could scarcely 'market' items 'for' a particular use without intending that
use." Id. at 502.
298. Id at 502-03.
299. Id. at 503 n.20.
300. Dan-Cohen, supra note 250, at 660. In criticizing this cure for vagueness, Dan-Cohen
quotes LaFave and Scott to suggest that scienter only applies to one's intention to do an act,
not to knowledge of the statute. Id.
301. Id. at 663.
302. Vagueness cannot be demonstrated deductively because these determinations ulti-
mately come down to subjective determinations by individual judges. The judge must simply
decide whether particular language is clear enough to apprise prosecutors and potential de-
fendants of the forbidden conduct. In this respect, a vagueness determination is analogous to a
jury's evaluation in a negligence action of whether certain conduct is "reasonable."
To determine whether a statute is clear enough to show what conduct is forbidden, the
reviewing court has only the general guidance of Connally v. General Construction Co., 269
U.S. 385 (1926), and its progeny. In Connally, the Supreme Court stated that "a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law." Id. at 391 (citing International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,
234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914)). While stating the general policy behind the vagueness doctrine, this
directive is of little practical value because each decision turns on the particular language of
the given statute. Unless a subsequent case presents only a slight variation of a statutory term,
each decision has no value as precedent. For example, Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
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indicate that the term "pattern" should be held void for vagueness: Con-
gress' lack of agreement about the meaning of pattern;3°3the scope of judicial
disagreement about the term;3"4 and the multiplicity of judicial "tests" em-
ploying additional factors beyond continuity and relationship.30 5 In addi-
tion, the major policies supporting the void-for-vagueness doctrine suggest
that "pattern" is unconstitutionally vague in most situations.3°6 Given the
level of clarity required of criminal statutes, RICO is unconstitutional be-
cause it provides insufficient notice to potential defendants and inadequate
guidance for public and private law enforcement.
A. An Appropriate Standard of Clarity for RICO
Due process requires that all statutes be reasonably clear.30 7 Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court allows varying degrees of ambiguity depending on
the type of statute at issue.308 For example, the Court requires great clarity
where the law threatens to inhibit constitutional rights, such as the freedom
of speech.319 In contrast, the Court tolerates more ambiguity where the stat-
ute regulates economic conduct. For a clear understanding of a regulation,
businesses facing economic demands can carefully consider relevant legisla-
tion, inquire as to a regulation's ambiguous meaning, and resort to adminis-
trative action. 310 When analyzing RICO, an important distinction arises
between statutes which impose civil versus criminal penalties. 311 While in-
carceration and public humiliation may result from conviction for criminal
offenses, civil suits usually result in damage awards and injunctive relief.
312
(1939), stated that a legislature must clearly define "gang" before making gang membership
criminal. Id. at 453-55. The decision does not help subsequent courts--or a legislative body,
for that matter-decide whether a term is clear enough to pass constitutional muster.
303. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 96-235 and accompanying text.
305. Id.
306. See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.
307. See, e.g., Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967).
308. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498
(1982).
309. Id.; Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) ("stricter standards of permissible
statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potential inhibiting effect on speech").
310. Village of Hoffman Estates, 445 U.S. at 495 n.7; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
13 (1976) (ceilings on financial contributions limit freedom of political expression and associa-
tion more severely than they limit freedom to contribute).
311. In Village of Hoffman Estates Justice Marshall explained this distinction: "The
Court has ... expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penal-
ties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe." 455 U.S. at 489-99
(citing Barenblass v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)).
312. See Note, Civil RICO is a Misnomer: The Need for Criminal Procedural Protections in
Actions Under 18 US.C. § 1964, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1291-94 (1987) (pointing out that
"[a] legal sanction can be characterized as punishment only when it is accompanied by societal
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In short, "due process justifies attention to fairness commensurate with the
penalty involved." '
The Supreme Court should demand tremendous specificity for RICO's
criminal provisions-including the term "pattern. 3 1 4 In addition to a pos-
sible fine plus twenty years in prison, criminal RICO provides for forfeiture
of all assets gained through racketeering activity.313 Clarity is important
due to the severity of the criminal penalties involved and the chance that a
convicted RICO defendant will be branded a "racketeer." A more difficult
question is whether courts should be more lenient in judging the language of
RICO's civil provisions. Criminal and civil RICO cases define the substan-
tive offenses in the same terms, and a private plaintiff must prove each ele-
ment that would support a criminal RICO conviction. The penalties differ,
however, for a criminal or civil violation.316 If private plaintiffs can prove
damage in their "business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962," then civil RICO provides for treble damages and attorneys fees.317
This section also allows the United States Attorney General to institute pro-
ceedings and gives the courts broad powers, including the power to "order[]
... any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any
enterprise."
3 18
Stiff penalties, however, do not transform a civil statute into a criminal
one. Where criminal and civil sanctions are aimed at the same conduct,
there seems to be little justification for applying different standards to the
same statutory language. 3 9 First, having two standards of clarity under-
mines the policy behind the void-for-vagueness doctrine.3 2 ° Second, where
denunciation of the commission of the act for which the sanction is applied"); see also Hart,
The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 (1958).
313. Note, Big Mama Rag, supra note 242, at 1556 n.6 (citing death penalty cases, which
"make this point most clearly"); see, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 593 (1978) (where the
Court considered the nature and circumstances of the offense, as well as the defendant's his-
tory, character and condition).
314. Note, supra note 169, at 518-19 (arguing that RICO's criminal provisions should be
subject to strict scrutiny for vagueness).
315. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a), (b); see also supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (explain-
ing criminal penalties imposed for violations of section 1962 and section 1963).
316. Note, supra note 312, at 1291-97 (arguing for greater procedural protections in civil
RICO because the action is essentially a criminal charge).
317. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
318. Id § 1964(a).
319. Note, supra note 312, at 1292; see also Freeman & McSlarrow, RICO and the Due
Process "Void for Vagueness" Test, 45 Bus. LAW. 1003, 1006 (1990) ("[I]t would be anomalous
to find the language unconstitutionally vague where criminal sanctions are invoked, but clear
enough to sustain imposition of punitive, though civil, sanctions.").
320. The policy behind the doctrine is to provide direction for defendants and law enforce-
ment officials. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
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private plaintiffs are functioning as surrogates for the government, in the
position of "private attorneys general," concerns about guidance are even
more important than if government lawyers were prosecuting the cases.
Recent Supreme Court opinions indicate that the Court would demand a
high degree of clarity from both civil and criminal RICO provisions. In his
concurrence in HJ. Inc., Justice Scalia found that "RICO... must, even in
its civil applications, possess the degree of certainty required for criminal
laws." '321 This statement is consistent with the Court's greater concern for
procedural fairness when a statute is punitive rather than remedial.322 Ever
since Boyd v. United States,323 decided in 1886, the Court has used the puni-
tive/remedial standard to determine whether a statute is criminal or civil.324
If the Court finds a statute to be punitive, it jealously guards the defendant's
due process rights.325 In spite of the label, the civil provision of RICO is
punitive because it "imposes sanctions on a defendant for behavior that is
already a crime and... has a scienter requirement., 326 These characteristics
cause courts to find a punitive purpose in the civil provisions, therefore re-
quiring greater procedural protections. If a court follows this analysis and
determines that the civil provisions are punitive, then the court should re-
quire the same level of clarity for a civil, criminal, or quasi-criminal suit.
Though not a RICO case, Village of Hoffman Estates, like HJ. Inc., indi-
cates that the Court will tolerate little ambiguity in RICO's civil provi-
sions.327 In Village of Hoffman Estates, a local ordinance required
businesses to obtain a license if they sold drug paraphernalia. The ordinance
imposed a fine of between $10 and $500 if a business failed to obtain such a
license.328 In spite of this modest penalty, the Court applied a "relatively
strict test," viewing the statute as "quasi-criminal" rather than civil.329 The
Court found it particularly significant that the ordinance had "prohibitory
and stigmatizing effects" because no retailer would want to be known as a
distributor of drug paraphernalia.330 If the Village of Hoffman Estates ordi-
nance had to meet a "relatively strict" standard, RICO's civil provisions
321. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 255 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (citing FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954)).
322. Note, supra note 312, at 1292; see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989)
(distinguishing between remedial and punitive civil statutes).
323. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
324. See Note, supra note 312, at 1292-93 (containing a concise description of the court's
distinction between a civil and criminal proceeding in Boyd).
325. Id. at 1293-94.
326. Id. at 1297.
327. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 497-99 (1982).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 499.
330. Id. at 499 n.16.
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should be held to the highest standard of clarity. Being known as a racket-
eer carries a greater stigma than being known as a seller of drug parapherna-
lia, and the potential financial penalties under civil RICO are much greater
than even the maximum fine imposed under the Village of Hoffman Estates
ordinance.3 3 1
B. Congressional and Judicial Indications That the Pattern Requirement
is Unconstitutionally Vague
As the discussion in Section I of this Article indicates, Congress appar-
ently interpreted "pattern" in a variety of ways when it passed the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act. Senator McClellan, and those senators who
prepared the Senate Report, believed pattern required "something beyond"
two acts of racketeering. 332 The language in the Report is ambiguous, but
these senators found this "something beyond" to be either continuity plus
relationship, as Justice Brennan argued in HJ. Inc., or relationship alone, as
this Article suggests. 333 Another group of congressmen apparently believed
that the term "pattern" did not have any additional requirement and only
referred to the number of predicate acts.334
This disagreement does not prove that the statute is unconstitutionally
vague, for some congressmen might have misunderstood a reasonably clear
term. Nevertheless, the inability of legislators to agree on a term's meaning
should be weighed in a reviewing court's determination of whether a "rea-
sonable person" would understand the statute. Moreover, the fact that Con-
gress neither thrashed out the meaning of the term "pattern," nor even
acknowledged the disagreement as to its meaning, indicates the inherent am-
biguity in the word. Congress may have rushed over this term, believing
everyone knew what "pattern" meant.335 Each legislator most likely read
his own subjective understanding of the word "pattern" into the statute.
Disparate interpretations by reviewing courts, like disagreements among
legislators, may also indicate that a statute is ambiguous. The history of
RICO's pattern requirement is marked by varieties of interpretation. Before
Sedima, many courts said pattern only referred to the number of predicate
acts.336 Even after the Supreme Court imported continuity and relationship
331. See Freeman & McSlarrow, supra note 319, at 1006-08 (arguing that the treble dam-
age provision of civil RICO makes the statute punitive).
332. See supra notes 53-74 and accompanying text.
333. Id.
334. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
335. See, e.g., supra note 80 and accompanying text (Rep. Poff implied that the meaning of
the term pattern was simple and straightforward).
336. See, e.g., United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975).
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from the statute's legislative history, presumably adding more definiteness to
the statute, federal courts continued to interpret pattern in different ways.337
For example, the Second Circuit, before 1989, required nothing more than
two acts to find a pattern of racketeering. 33 ' The Eighth Circuit, however,
required more than one "scheme., 339 In addition, several other circuits ini-
tially seemed to view the number of schemes as dispositive, although these
courts often employed different labels, such as "episodes" or
"transactions."340
A majority of the circuits, however, fall somewhere between these two
extremes. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have listed various factors
which indicate the presence of a pattern, including the number of victims
and the number of perpetrators.3 41 The Tenth, Ninth, and Second (after
Indelicato) Circuits have used some of these same factors in determining
whether continuity and relationship have been separately established. 42
Other courts have employed certain factors to determine whether continuity
or relationship is present, apparently ignoring the other prong of the
Sedima/HJ. Inc. test.
34 3
These varied interpretations of "pattern" support the claim that the term
is vague. Statutory interpretation is the essence of the judicial function; long
practice in such interpretation makes judges "specialists" in this area.
Therefore, if judges, especially federal appellate judges, disagree radically
about the interpretation of a statutory term, then it is reasonable to infer that
the term is unclear. If the term is unclear to federal judges, then it will be
unclear to laymen and prosecutors.
The numerous judicial "glosses" applied to the term "pattern"-from the
Eighth Circuit's multi-scheme test to the Third Circuit's multi-factor test-
also indicate that appellate courts do not think "pattern" is definite. By
337. See supra notes 81-241 and accompanying text.
338. See, e.g., United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1121 (2d Cir. 1980).
339. See, e.g., Madden v. Gluck, 815 F.2d 1163, 1164 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006
(1987); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986).
340. See, e.g., Brandt v. Schal Assocs., Inc., 854 F.2d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 1988); Torwest
DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 1987).
341. See, e.g., Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1309 (6th Cir. 1989), cert denied,
110 S. Ct. 1122 (1990); Saporito v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 843 F.2d 666, 676 (3d Cir. 1988);
Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986).
342. See, e.g., United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 110
S. Ct. 56 (1989); United Energy Owners v. United Energy Management, 837 F.2d 356, 360
(9th Cir. 1988); Torwest DBC, 810 F.2d at 928.
343. Compare Durham v. Business Management Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505, 1512 (11th Cir.
1988) (ignoring relationship and using factors listed in Dangerous Special Offender Act in
determining continuity) with R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir.
1985) (ignoring continuity and using the same factors in determining relationship).
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including such concrete requirements as the number of acts or victims, the
circuits have attempted to add some definiteness to the general language of
Sedima. In evaluating whether a pattern exists, it is possible to count the
number of victims and to judge "the character of the unlawful activity." 3"
One can determine, for example, that one crime is more serious than an-
other. It is also possible to determine if various criminal acts were done in
furtherance of a single "scheme" or "episode." Determining whether some
activity exhibits "continuity or the threat of continuity," however, is more
difficult. By defining pattern in a definite manner, the circuits have tried to
give the district courts, and presumably defendants and prosecutors, gui-
dance in understanding the term. Nevertheless, these decisions imply that
the term is imprecise. Although these decisions do not prove that the term
"pattern" is vague, the presence of multiple, widely divergent interpretations
indicates some fundamental problem with the statute.
C. Policy Arguments Suggesting That "Pattern" Is
Unconstitutionally Vague
1. Notice to Defendants
The policies underlying the definiteness requirement also suggest that
"pattern" is unconstitutionally vague. First, RICO does not provide suffi-
cient warning to potential defendants that particular conduct is prohib-
ited.34 If the underlying predicate act has been clearly defined, however, it
could be argued that the defendant has been reasonably warned that his con-
duct is illegal. Moreover, because two acts are necessary for a RICO viola-
tion, the defendant has been warned that committing multiple criminal acts
may subject him to prosecution. 3 Several courts followed this approach in
response to the first vagueness attacks on the pattern requirement.347
344. Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755, 758 (3d Cir. 1989); Feitner, 879 F.2d at 1298.
345. See infra notes 368-93 and accompanying text.
346. See infra notes 347-64 and accompanying text.
347. See, e.g., United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd
mem., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978). For example, in United
States v. Campanale, the Ninth Circuit simply stated that "[a]ny ambiguity is cured by 18
U.S.C. § 1961, which defines 'racketeering activity' with reference to specific offenses, 'pattern
of racketeering activity' with reference to a definite number of acts of 'racketeering activity'
within specified time periods, and 'enterprise' and 'person' with standard language of estab-
lished meaning." 518 F.2d at 352. The court apparently saw no need for an additional warn-
ing which would define the requisite connection between the two acts. See also United States
v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 884 (E.D. Wis. 1974) ("the only serious question is whether
§ 1962(c) gives [the defendant] adequate warning that the commission of more than one such
criminal act under certain circumstances constitutes an additional, separate crime for which
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The Supreme Court might accept this interpretation of RICO based on its
recent Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana decision.348 Fort Wayne involved
first amendment and due process challenges to Indiana's RICO law, which
was modeled after the federal statute but distinguished by its more detailed
definition of pattern. 349 Defendants were prosecuted under RICO for violat-
ing Indiana's obscenity statute, included in the list of predicate acts. In re-
jecting the defendant's vagueness argument, the Supreme Court stated that
the RICO statute could not be unconstitutionally vague if the obscenity law
was not, because the RICO statute encompassed the obscenity statute.
350
The Court believed that due process required only reasonable clarity in the
definition of the predicate acts.
351
The fundamental flaw in this reasoning is its failure to consider the effect
of a RICO violation on the defendant's penalty. In numerous cases, a de-
fendant may receive an expanded penalty for a minor crime solely because
the additional RICO elements are present.3 52 In United States v. Stofsky,353
for example, the court recognized that the defendant could receive a
"twenty-year prison term, a $25,000 fine and substantial forfeitures for the
there is a separate penalty") (quoting United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 612
(S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
348. Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
349. Apparently, the Indiana legislature borrowed its definition of pattern from the Dan-
gerous Special Offender Act; the language of the two statutes is identical. Id at 51; see supra
note 53 and accompanying text.
350. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 58-59 n.7 ("it would seem that the RICO statute is
inherently less vague than any state obscenity law" because the prosecution would have to
prove the crimes themselves plus the connection).
351. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented on the question of
the Indiana statute's vagueness. Id at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Likening the pattern re-
quirement to Justice Stewart's "I know it when I see it" standard for obscenity, Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), Justice Stevens argued that
"[r]eference to a 'pattern' of at least two violations only compounds the intractable vagueness
of the obscenity concept itself." Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens did not discuss whether the state statute, which employed the Dangerous Spe-
cial Offender definition, was any more definite than the definition of pattern in the federal
statute.
352. See, e.g., United States v. Haley, 689 F. Supp. 717, 720 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (judges
found guilty of bribery received lesser penalties than those found guilty of bribery and RICO
violations); Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 46. The criminal penalties for a RICO violation
under Indiana law are more severe than those authorized in an obscenity offense. If the peti-
tioner in Fort Wayne Books were found guilty of the two RICO counts, he would face a maxi-
mum of 10 years in prison and a $20,000 fine; if he were only convicted of the six obscenity
offenses, the maximum punishment would be 6 years in jail and $30,000 in fines. 489 U.S. at
46. Of course, in those cases where conviction for the predicate crimes separately will result in
a virtually identical penalty, a warning argument is not compelling.
353. 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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commission of two misdemeanors within a period of ten years." '354 A RICO
conviction may result in penalties far greater than the penalties imposed for
the predicate acts. Consequently, potential defendants deserve clear warning
about each element of a crime. Assigning light sentences for isolated acts,
but heavy sentences for connected acts, indicates that the acts become seri-
ous only when they are connected. If this relationship can transform a mi-
nor crime into a major one, a potential defendant deserves to have the
connection clearly defined.3"'
While none of the early courts addressing the pattern issue held that
RICO's pattern requirement was unconstitutionally vague, many implied
that "pattern" had to be reasonably clear.356 It is not enough, as the Ninth
Circuit argued, to have clarity for the predicate crimes and the minimum
number of crimes. 3 7 In United States v. Boffa,35 one of the few decisions to
examine the pattern question in any detail, the Delaware District Court
stated that "any reasonable person would realize that if he pursued the [al-
leged] course of activity.., he would be conducting or participating in the
conduct of the Enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity."' 35 9 After holding that the defendant had notice, the court had no occa-
sion to discuss the need for clarity in the pattern requirement.360 The
court's detailed discussion of "pattern," however, implies that the term
should be subject to due process scrutiny. The court noted that the defend-
ant was apprised of the Third Circuit's liberal interpretation of "pattern,"
which required each act to be "in some way connected to the affairs of the
Enterprise. ' 36 1 The court then said that the defendant had notice "even
under the very narrow definition of the term 'pattern' which has been
adopted by some courts. ' 362 This narrow definition required the acts to be
related by "some common scheme, plan or motive. ' 36 3 If the defendant had
354. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. at 614; see 18 U.S.C. § 1963. Since Stofsky the RICO statute
has been amended to reflect the following penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 1963: fines, maximum
prison sentence of 20 years (or life if the violation of RICO includes a racketeering activity for
which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment), and forfeiture of any interest ac-
quired in violation of section 1962.
355. Freeman & McSlarrow, supra note 319, at 1009-10.
356. See, eg., United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975) (court stated
that "it is true that if not defined, terms such as 'pattern of racketeering activity' would be
unmanageable."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
357. Id
358. 513 F. Supp. 444 (D. Del. 1980).
359. Id at 462.
360. Id.
361. Id at 463.
362. Id (citing United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 883 (E.D. Wis. 1974); United
States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
363. Id (quoting Stofsky 409 F. Supp. at 614).
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adequate warning anyway, there would be no reason to stress that he had
notice of these "interpretative" requirements. Thus, a number of courts ap-
parently believed that the pattern requirement had to be reasonably clear to
potential defendants. 3 4
2. Guidance For Law Enforcement Officials
While the policy of providing notice to potential defendants is vitally im-
portant, "the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine 'is not actual
notice, but... the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guide-
lines to govern law enforcement.' "36 When RICO is examined in light of
this policy, the vagueness argument is even more compelling.
a. Criminal Prosecution
Given the circuits' contradictory interpretations of "pattern," a govern-
ment lawyer has little guidance in deciding whether to charge a defendant
with a RICO violation. Cases do exist which would establish a pattern in all
circuits. For example, if a group of individuals organized to commit crimi-
nal acts, and then pursued their goal in several contexts against numerous
victims over a significant period of time, then every circuit would find a
pattern of racketeering.366 The circuits' interpretations begin to differ when
fewer acts are committeed and there are fewer victims.
In a situation similar to Indelicato, involving only three crimes, a United
States Attorney would have little guidance in determining whether his case
meets the pattern requirement. The Second Circuit's expansive interpreta-
tion of pattern seems to support a RICO charge.367 The Third and Seventh
Circuit's more restrictive views would not.36 Without clear guidance, a
United States Attorney has broad discretion in deciding whether to charge a
defendant under RICO. If a United States Attorney prosecutes a case that
the legislature did not intend to come within the statute,369 government re-
sources will be wasted.
More importantly, the absence of guidance to law enforcement officials
may result in "'arbitrary and discriminatory applications,' ,,370 or the prose-
364. See White, 386 F. Supp. at 883-84; Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. at 612.
365. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 574 (1974)).
366. See supra notes 83-225 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 145-67 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 100-19 and accompanying text.
369. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); see also supra note 248
(discussing Roberts).
370. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498
(1982) (quoting Grayned v. City of Richmond, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
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cutor may pursue his own predilections.3 The danger of prosecutorial
abuse is always present because the system of justice in the United States
grants prosecutors great discretion. There is virtually no judicial review of a
prosecutor's decision to pursue or to drop charges.37 2 Furthermore, the
dangers of unchecked prosecutorial abuse are heightened under RICO be-
cause of the general language of the statute and the long list of predicate
acts.37 3 RICO's use against such diverse "enterprises" as labor unions, se-
curities brokers, law firms, "right-to-life" groups, and accounting firms
shows the statute's breadth and the discretion it invests in federal
prosecutors.37 4
The concern about public pressure on federal prosecutors is magnified be-
cause RICO allows prosecutors such broad discretion. Prosecutors may
choose to prosecute a defendant because of the type of crime committed,
even though the extent of the activity was limited. For example, if a pro-
choice group pressured the local United States Attorney's Office to prosecute
members of Operation Rescue, the United States Attorney might bring the
charge even if it involved only two criminal misdemeanors. Furthermore, a
prosecutor could refuse to seek an indictment against a brokerage house, or
even a criminal syndicate, where a more elaborate scheme was present.
RICO is a dangerous weapon because, in addition to the problem of public
pressure, possible benefits may accrue to individual prosecutors and local
United States Attorneys' offices for using the statute to prosecute cases. For-
mer United States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani has demonstrated that prose-
cuting certain types of cases can catapult individuals into the public eye. 375
The danger is that United States Attorneys may choose to prosecute RICO
371. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974).
372. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 474 F.2d 375, 379-80 (2d Cir.
1973).
373. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel
of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 765, 852
n.425 (1989) ("[b]ecause prosecutors easily can allege many crimes as RICO offenses"); Sym-
posium: White Collar Crime: RICO Forfeiture In Practice: A Prosecutorial Perspective, 52 U.
CIN. L. REv. 404, 405 n. 15 (1983) ("[t]he prosecutor has considerable discretion in his deci-
sion to bring RICO charges"); Comment, The Need for Greater Double Jeopardy and Due
Process Safeguards in RICO Criminal and Civil Actions, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 724, 727 (1982)
("wide discretion prosecutors have to bring such prosecutions"); see also United States v. Da-
vidoff, 845 F.2d 1151, 1154 (2d Cir. 1988) ("wide latitude accorded the prosecution to frame a
charge that a defendant has 'conspired' to promote the affairs of an 'enterprise' through a
'pattern of racketeering activity' ").
374. See Huestis, RICO: The Meaning of 'Pattern'Since Sedima, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV.
621, 622 n.8 (1988) (listing types of cases).
375. See, e.g., Giuliani Weighs Private Post as Step to Senate Race, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3,
1987, at BI, col. 2.
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cases, not because the challenged conduct is egregious, but because the pub-
lic is captivated by certain types of crime.
Finally, without adequate direction, discrimination may influence a prose-
cutor's decision about whom to charge under RICO. Although there is a
risk of discriminatory enforcement for all vague statutes, the risk is even
greater where the target is organized crime. The public perceives organized
crime as governed by several Italian families, and such perception pervades
the legislative history of the Organized Crime Control Act.376 The statute,
however, makes no mention of particular ethnic groups, or even of "gangs"
generally. Instead, it prohibits broad classes of criminal conduct involving
an enterprise.377 The danger is that prosecutors will act based on such a
perception of organized crime, regardless of the accuracy of the perception.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has established institutional structures
to guide United States Attorneys who are planning to prosecute RICO cases.
These structures include a set of guidelines for RICO prosecutions and a
separate RICO office designed to oversee government use of the statute.
378
This action by the DOJ, which advocates internal controls, attests to the
Department's concern about abuse of the statute. In addition, DOJ's estab-
lishment of prosecutorial guidelines indicates that it believes RICO provides
inadequate guidance to prosecutors regarding who should be prosecuted.
Although these guidelines are preferable to no guidance, they are not law.
Therefore, to the degree that individual prosecutors are free from DOJ con-
trol, these guidelines are largely irrelevant. Moreover, several studies have
indicated that DOJ has limited control over many federal prosecutors. Ac-
cording to J. Eisenstein, "'[c]rucial differences in the recruitment, resources,
political support from the community, and organizational status of U.S. At-
torneys.., translate into substantial autonomy. ' 379 Given this institutional
autonomy and the great latitude which RICO provides, a lack of
prosecutorial guidance on "pattern" is especially dangerous.
376. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 18,940-41 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan, discussing
La Cosa Nostra).
377. Cf Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939) (declaring unconstitionally
vague a state statute which punished "gang" membership without adequately defining the
term).
378. Dennis, Current RICO Policies of the Department of Justice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 651,
654-55 (1990) ("all government actions were and are subject to strict internal review and con-
trols"); Dombrink & Meeker, Racketeering Prosecution: The Use and Abuse of RICO, 16
RUTGERS L.J. 633, 641 (1985).
379. Dombrink & Meeker, supra note 378, at 642 (quoting J. EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR




Although RICO's ambiguous pattern requirement risks arbitrary and dis-
criminatory criminal prosecutions, the greater danger comes from suits by
private plaintiffs. Unless the public demands prosecution of particular indi-
viduals, or certain types of cases, there is no special risk of prosecutors inten-
tionally abusing RICO. United States Attorneys' salaries are not tied to
successful prosecutions of RICO cases, and it is assumed that United States
Attorneys will save RICO for more egregious cases.38 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c),
however, allows private plaintiffs to enforce RICO. An ambiguous defini-
tion of pattern is most troubling in private suits.381  Under civil RICO, full
discretion is given to the individual attorney of each private plaintiff. Once it
is established that a defendant has committed at least two predicate acts
within a ten-year period, the plaintiff's lawyer then decides if the acts form a
pattern of racketeering. Moreover, the attorney determines whether the req-
uisite "something beyond" is present in his client's case.382
A private right of action coupled with ambiguous statutory language is
troubling under any circumstances, but it is especially troubling under
RICO because the statute provides for treble damages and attorney's fees.
383
These provisions give a plaintiff and his attorney every incentive to charge a
defendant with a RICO violation whenever possible. In the criminal con-
text, there are some internal controls on charges of racketeering; in the civil
RICO context, however, the private attorney determines whether to pursue
a suit.
In addition, arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is a greater danger
under civil RICO because many more suits are brought under this section.
Limitations on resources restrict the number of RICO criminal prosecutions
the government may bring, but there are no such external limits on private
plaintiffs, as demonstrated by the huge number of civil RICO suits brought
380. This assumption is based upon the fact that a RICO prosecution, with its require-
ments of multiple criminal acts, is more difficult to prove than an underlying crime by itself.
381. In Kolender, Justice O'Connor found especially troubling the "full discretion accorded
to the police to determine whether the suspect [had] provided a 'credible and reliable' identifi-
cation." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360 (1983) (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
575 (1974)).
382. Of course, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an attorney may be sanctioned
where motions he files are not "grounded in fact," not "warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument of the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law," or "interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay." FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
Given the lack of agreement about the meaning of the term pattern, however, proof of two acts
without anything else would probably meet this minimal standard.
383. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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each year.384 Any plaintiff whose attorney believes his case meets the pat-
tern requirement can allege a RICO violation. The void-for-vagueness doc-
trine is based on the belief that a vague statute increases the probability of
arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions; therefore, allowing these addi-
tional civil suits increases the likelihood that some will have deleterious ef-
fects. Not only may RICO be employed as a litigation tactic, but plaintiffs'
attorneys acting in good faith may use this powerful weapon whenever possi-
ble.38 5 Enticed by the prospect of treble damages and attorney's fees, plain-
tiffs' attorneys may push the boundaries of the statute far beyond the core
situations envisioned by Congress. Such action increases the risk that RICO
will be used against individuals who were never intended to be a target of the
statute.
D. Conclusion: Facial and Partial Vagueness
RICO's pattern requirement threatens fifth amendment freedoms by com-
bining an ambiguous term with a statute granting tremendous discretion to
prosecutors and private plaintiffs. The result of this combination requires
that the statute be held facially vague. Under Kolender, a defendant may
challenge a criminal statute on its face "even when it could conceivably have
some valid application. 3 6 The defendant need not demonstrate that the
statute is vague in all its applications, as required in a noncriminal con-
text.387 Moreover, Kolender suggests that when arbitrary and discrimina-
384. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985) (citing Report of the Ad
Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, A.B.A. SEC. CORP. BANKING & Bus. L. 55-56 (1985)). Through
1982, fewer than seventy RICO cases had been reported, but in 1983 the number of RICO
cases decided exceeded the total amount from previous years. Huestis, supra note 374, at 622
n.8. In 1984, the number of RICO cases filed increased by approximately 30%. Id.
385. See Freeman & McSlarrow, supra note 319, at 1009.
386. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n.8 (1983). Without the guidance of
Kolender, a number of lower federal courts held that RICO's pattern requirement was not
facially vague because it was not vague in all of its applications. They did not consider the
special dangers of arbitrary enforcement but only asked if the defendant had adequate notice.
See, e.g., United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 444, 462 (Del. 1980).
387. Of course, in Kolender the conduct governed by the ambiguous personal identification
requirement was constitutionally-protected. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361. The Court quite
explicitly grounded its holding upon the right to move freely without arbitrary interference by
the police by stating that "[o]ur concern here is based upon the 'potential for arbitrarily sup-
pressing First Amendment liberties....' In addition, § 647(e) implicates consideration of the
constitutional right to freedom of movement." Id at 358 (citations omitted). Such language
demonstrates that the type of conduct being regulated had a great impact upon the Court's
holding. The combination of ambiguous statutory language with probable encroachments on
constitutionally protected conduct seems to have had a significant impact on the Court's deter-
mination that the statute was facially vague.
In contrast, RICO does not trench upon constitutionally protected conduct, unless the pred-
icate crimes themselves implicate constitutional rights. See, eg., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v.
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tory enforcement is a danger, courts should allow a defendant to attack the
statute without having to allege that it is vague as applied to his conduct.
Under RICO's enforcement scheme, there are dangers that public pressure
may influence the charging of particular groups under criminal RICO, and
also that the treble damage provision in civil RICO may encourage plaintiffs
to allege a RICO violation. This danger of discriminatory enforcement sup-
ports a holding of facial vagueness.3"'
Even if a reviewing court would not declare RICO's pattern requirement
void in toto, however, there are numerous situations where the term should
be found vague as applied to particular defendants. For example, referring
back to the criminal hypothetical employed in Section II, assume that the
defendant has committed two acts of mail fraud. Further assume that the
Commission ordered the defendant to defraud the two individuals, thereby
weakening the individuals' financial base. The defendant in this situation
can argue that he has not been fairly warned that his conduct meets the
pattern requirement because, although he has committed two predicate acts,
whether the acts demonstrate the requisite "something beyond" depends on
the circuit.
The Fifth Circuit would find a pattern because the acts unquestionably
relate to each other.38 9 The Tenth Circuit, however, would not find a pat-
tern because "[a] scheme to achieve a single discrete objective does not in
and of itself create a threat of ongoing activity." 3" Under the Second Cir-
cuit's Indelicato analysis, the acts would form a pattern because they are
related to a continuing criminal enterprise.3 91 In the Seventh Circuit, the
small number of criminal acts, the short life of the crime, and the few victims
would probably doom the charge, even though the number of "schemes" is
no longer considered.392
Consequently, the policy decision should be the same whether one accepts
the more expansive argument that RICO's pattern requirement is facially
vague, or the more limited argument that the term is vague in different situa-
Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 84-85 (1989). Therefore, the court would be less likely to uphold a facial
vagueness challenge in spite of the high risk of discriminatory enforcement.
388. See Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987).
389. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
390. Torwes4 801 F.2d at 928-29. For example, one commentator has suggested that se-
curities fraud should be narrowly construed "to cover only [those] types of activities" where
organized crime is likely to be involved. Note, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limi-
tation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1513, 1543 (1983); see supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 154-75 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
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tions. Congress should revamp RICO to cure this indefiniteness, either by
redefining the term "pattern" or by redesigning the whole statute.393
V. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Concerned that RICO was being used for purposes far different from
those originally intended by Congress, numerous commentators have sug-
gested ways to limit the statute's scope. 94 Each of these commentators has
begun his analysis with the presumption that the original Racketeering In-
fluenced Corrupt Organizations Act has been disfigured by its use since
1970. They point to the use of RICO, by United States Attorneys and pri-
vate plaintiffs, in cases involving "legitimate" businesses, such as Drexel
Burnham Lambert, and innocent organizations, such as Operation Res-
cue. 395 These commentators also focus on private plaintiffs' excessive use of
the statute in cases of "garden variety" fraud.396 Such uses, these commen-
tators assert, demonstrate that RICO is being employed in ways contrary to
Congress' intent.
In contrast to these commentators, this Article does not assume that
RICO has been twisted beyond all semblance of its original form. Conse-
quently, this Article's legislative prescription does not attempt to return
RICO to its roots, or to redefine pattern to encompass only traditional or-
ganized crime. This Article assumes that Congress is aware that RICO is
being used in ordinary corporate cases. Whether Congress originally envi-
sioned RICO to be employed in these ways, it has heard this complaint since
the early 1980s. 397 Nevertheless, Congress has left the statute virtually un-
changed. Instead, this Article assumes that RICO's pattern requirement is
393. Two commentators have argued that "[c]ongressional amendment, rather than void-
ing the statute on vagueness grounds, is the appropriate way to limit RICO." Note, supra note
169, at 526. But such a view misconstrues the role of the courts in a due process vagueness
inquiry. Courts must determine whether a statute, as drafted, is sufficiently clear to be under-
stood by potential defendants and prosecutors. Whether the legislature should or would
amend a statute is beyond the duty of a reviewing court.
394. See Huestis, supra note 374, at 644-47; Note, supra note 169, at 498.
395. See Note, supra note 169, at 522 n.254; Comment, RICO Forfeiture: Secured Lenders
Beware, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1199, 1217 (1990) (regarding Drexel Burnham Lambert); Note,
The Use of Civil RICO Against Antiabortion Protesters and the Economic Motive Requirement,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1341 (1990) (regarding Operation Rescue).
396. See, e.g., Comment, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme Court Takes
the Racketeering Requirement Out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 821 (1986); Note, Civil
RICO and "Garden Variety" Fraud-A Suggested Analysis, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 93 (1983);
Comment, Civil RICO Actions in Commercial Litigation: Racketeer or Businessman?, 36 S.W.
L.J. 925 (1982).
397. See also Note, supra note 169, at 526. "Congress's failure to amend RICO to narrow




too ambiguous to pass constitutional muster as presently defined. Congress
should amend the definition of pattern because, even if it is not facially
vague, the term would be partially vague in many situations.
Even without the assumption that RICO should be drafted to apply only
to traditional criminal enterprises, it still would be necessary to make certain
assumptions about the types of activity covered by the statute. Congress
would have established huge penalties for predicate acts connected by a pat-
tern only if something about the pattern made the separate criminal acts
particularly destructive. Congress, however, was unclear about what caused
the heightened danger, and its statutory language needed clarification. The
Supreme Court asserted, in Sedima, that the statutory language regarding
"pattern" required "something beyond" two acts.398 With no more gui-
dance than continuity and relationship, the lower courts made their own
assumptions about why a pattern of racketeering activity was especially dan-
gerous. These assumptions then shaped the tests established by the courts to
determine whether a pattern was present. Some courts assumed RICO was
based on the quantity of injury, while other courts believed that the statute
dealt with the extent of the criminal activity. This Article assumes that
RICO is aimed at structural crime.3 99
A. Proposal For Altering The Statutory Language Of RICO
Based on the assumption that Congress focused on structural crime in
RICO, this Article recommends several changes. First, Congress should
amend section 1962, which prohibits particular activities, to replace all refer-
ences to "pattern" with the word "structural. ' "4 w Because "pattern of rack-
eteering" would no longer be part of the substantive crime, the phrase
should be removed from the definitional section of the statute. The amended
statute should retain the requirement that two acts occur within a ten-year
period, but should include this requirement in the definition of racketeering
activity-not the definition of "pattern."" 1  The new term "structural"
should be defined as follows:
398. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
399. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
400. Thus, section 1962(c) should read:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to con-
duct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through structural racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
401. Thus, the new definition should read:
"Racketeering activity" means two of more (A) acts or threats involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling... which are chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year; (B) acts which are indictable under any of the
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"[S]tructural racketeering activity" is only demonstrated where all
of the following are proven: (1) more than one person participated
in the crime or crimes, including conspirators; (2) the participants
filled specialized roles; and (3) the racketeering acts were not si-
multaneous or virtually simultaneous.
B. Defense of Proposal
In defending this proposal, this Article addresses the following issues:
(1) why it is necessary to omit the term "pattern;" (2) whether this proposal
achieves the purpose behind the enactment of RICO; and (3) whether the
new statute avoids the problems of the old statute.
The danger of retaining the term "pattern," while elaborating a clearer
definition, is that assumptions will "taint" subsequent interpretation. As the
foregoing discussion illustrates, the term "pattern" carries a great deal of
interpretative baggage in each circuit. Each appellate court has established a
test for determining whether a pattern exists based on its own assumptions
about Congress' intended target in RICO. Especially in close cases, courts
might import these old tests into the new statute, thus subordinating the new
elements in the process. Replacing the phrase "pattern of racketeering"
with the phrase "structural racketeering" will make clear that the old phrase
has been discarded, not merely reconditioned.
Use of the word "structural" will indicate to courts that the presence of a
criminal infrastructure makes the predicate acts especially dangerous. In the
past, numerous courts have reasonably assumed that the phrase "pattern of
racketeering" refers to some connection between or among the acts.4 2 Such
an interpretation comports with the common meaning of pattern. Usually
the word refers to a connection between or among discrete items, not their
connection to something else. If Congress passed RICO in an attempt to
dismantle criminal infrastructures, prohibiting certain patterns of conduct
was a clumsy and confusing mechanism. Although prohibiting a pattern of
racketeering implies that the acts are particularly destructive because of
their relationship, they are actually more dangerous because they grow out
following provisions of Title 18...; (C) acts which are indictable under Title 29....
(D) offenses involving fraud ... , or (E) acts which are indictable under the Cur-
rency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act which occurred within ten years of
each other.
402. Compare the Fifth Circuit's test in R.A.G.S. Couture v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir.
1985), which merely asks if there is a relationship between the acts, with the Second Circuit's
continuity and relationship test. Under the Second Circuit cases of United States v. Indelicato,
865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 56 (1989) and Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d




of a criminal structure. The acts are not more destructive in combination
than in isolation, but they serve as clues that a criminal infrastructure exists.
Use of the phrase "structural racketeering," with its three indicia of struc-
ture, will remedy the confusion. Courts will understand that the real target
of RICO is structural crime-not patterned crime.
The second issue concerns this Article's choice of a particular statutory
method for attacking structural crime, assuming this was Congress' intended
target. The amended statute retains the requirement of two predicate acts
within a ten-year period, although this requirement is placed within the defi-
nition of "racketeering activity." In addition, a requirement of "structural
racketeering activity" would replace the pattern requirement. Structural
racketeering activity would require two or more participants, including
those convicted of conspiracy to violate the Act, specialized roles for each
defendant, and non-simultaneous predicate acts.4°3 These three elements to-
gether demonstrate that the crimes are not random and unrelated, but are
connected to a criminal infrastructure.
Multiple participants are an essential characteristic of a criminal organiza-
tion. The danger of a criminal infrastructure is that participants within the
criminal organization are readily and easily interchangeable. Just as the
death of the chief executive officer does not destroy a corporation, so the
incarceration of a leader of a criminal organization will not shatter the struc-
ture. This danger, however, exists only if there is someone to take over the
position. When an individual acts alone, his conviction will prevent future
crime no matter how elaborate his plan. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
require proof that the defendant acted in concert with at least one other
person-a person who might continue the illegal activity if the first person
were incarcerated. The presence of multiple participants also makes it more
likely that some structure exists.' When individuals participate in an un-
dertaking, they ordinarily follow some organization plan. They usually do
not act randomly. The larger the number of participants, the greater the
chance that they are organized.
Role specialization among the participants also suggests that an ongoing
criminal structure may be the source of the predicate acts. By definition,
such specialization indicates that an organization is present. Undifferenti-
ated individuals acting randomly do not carry out structural activity, as in
403. By drafting more exact language, fewer criminal or civil suits may be brought. This is
simply the result of restricting the discretion presently given to United States Attorneys and to
lawyers for private plaintiffs. Presumably, the defendants who escape prosecution because of
the tightening of language will be the marginal cases who should not have been prosecuted in
the first place.
404. See Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1382.
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the case of a riot. Instead, persons with particular abilities or talents play
limited parts in the operation. For example, in the typical bank robbery,
someone plans the operation, someone drives the vehicle, someone breaks
into the safe, and someone holds the customers and employees hostage dur-
ing the operation. The advantage of specialization is that each individual
can focus on his particular responsibilities without having to master the en-
tire operation. Specialization increases the chance that a crime will be suc-
cessful because each person can become an expert in his limited area.
Moreover, role specialization makes it more likely that structural crimes
will be committed in the future. An individual who has become an expert
marksman in preparation for a successful bank robbery has every incentive
to continue in this position with the organization. For the marksman with a
specific expertise to be successful, the organization must continue to operate,
with each person playing his role. To the extent that each member is depen-
dent on the other members with specialized abilities, this pressure to main-
tain the organization will be magnified. Thus, the presence of role
specialization in a criminal operation increases the likelihood that the organ-
ization will survive beyond the particular crime.
While not conclusive, the requirement that the acts be separate in time
will avoid punishing nonstructural offenders and will increase the probability
that a criminal infrastructure exists. Simultaneity, or virtual simultaneity,
among several criminal acts indicates impulsiveness and spontaneity. If the
entire criminal operation takes only a few moments or hours-from the first
action taken to effectuate the first crime to the last action taken to conclude
the last crime-it is likely that the crime was spontaneous. 5 Impulsive
crimes are not the threats RICO sought to remedy. They are not planned or
carried out as part of an ongoing criminal organization. Therefore, estab-
lishing a bright-line rule will protect the impulsive actor.
Planned schemes usually involve a number of preparatory steps. There-
fore, a "virtually simultaneous" rule would also cover structural crime. It is
possible that a group of individuals could carry out a plan in which all of the
acts were simultaneous. The number of these cases would be few, however,
because the time period begins with the first step in the commission of the
crime, not the first illegal act.' If this time period is defined in terms of
actions, not crimes, then few structural crimes should fall through the RICO
net.
405. Examples include a series of threats directed at management by union leaders or a
double murder where a husband suddenly discovers his wife with her lover.
406. In a securities fraud scheme, for example, the sending of a letter to potential investors
to whet their appetites for a security to be offered later would count as the first action, even if
the fraudulent offers themselves were mailed simultaneously.
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The final issue is whether the proposed statute brings enough definiteness
to RICO to remedy the void-for-vagueness problem. The three factors
which define structural racketeering are relatively concrete. Consequently,
both prosecutors and potential defendants would be able to determine if cer-
tain conduct falls within the statutory proscriptions. Numbers are probably
the least ambiguous of all terms, so the numerical requirement of at least two
participants would pass constitutional muster. The temporal requirement is
also reasonably clear. It is not difficult to determine if the first action taken
to effectuate the first crime and the last action taken to complete the last
crime are "simultaneous or virtually simultaneous." The narrowness of this
exception should apprise prosecutors and defendants that any extended
criminal activity will come within the proposed statute.
Although role specialization is more ambiguous than either the numerical
or the temporal requirements, it should also survive a due process challenge.
A court would focus on whether the operation would achieve its desired
result if the defendant played his part unaided by others. Both the potential
defendant and the prosecutor know the plan-the defendant from his per-
sonal knowledge and the prosecutor from his witnesses. Further, role spe-
cialization can be inferred from the type of plan. There is role specialization
if the entire plan will fail because any individual fails in his assigned duty. If
both defendants and prosecutors can determine whether the defendant has
played a specialized role, then the phrase "role specialization" provides no-
tice and guidance.
Applying the proposed statute to several situations will demonstrate that
it is more definite than the vague continuity and relationship test. In In-
delicato, the Second Circuit struggled to find the requisite continuity among
the acts, ultimately looking beyond the acts to the criminal enterprise."'
The court based its decision on the assumption that RICO was designed to
attack structural crime.408 The court, however, did violence to the statute
when it satisfied the continuity requirement through the Commission. If
continuity and relationship are characteristics of a pattern of racketeering
acts, then the acts must demonstrate these traits.
In contrast, if the Second Circuit had employed the proposed statute, the
court would have found a RICO violation without stretching the pattern
requirement beyond recognition. The first requirement was met: two other
men aided Indelicato in the shooting, and several other individuals carried
out preliminary functions.' There was also some role specialization, even
407. Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1383-85.
408. Id. at 1381-84.
409. Id. at 1372.
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though the murder required the three "soldiers" to perform the same task.
The order to commit the murders came from the Commission, and various
members of the Commission were involved in the planning.41° Further, one
individual was given the responsibility of collecting the various weapons and
bringing them to Indelicato.411 Of the three requirements, the separateness
requirement is the most difficult because the three murders were virtually
simultaneous. In this case, however, certain collateral activity satisfies this
requirement. The getaway car was stolen a month before the murder, and
the weapons were retrieved from the "safe house" at least several days ear-
lier.412 Therefore, even though the murders were simultaneous, certain ac-
tivities needed to consummate the murders covered a substantial period of
time. If no collateral criminal activity had been involved, then the temporal
requirement would have precluded a RICO charge. As in the criminal hy-
pothetical outlined in Section II of this Article, it also would be difficult to
show role specialization if there were no collateral activity. In addition, the
virtual simultaneity of the acts would fail to satisfy the temporal
requirement.
The amended statute would also provide more guidance in the civil con-
text, where the circuits have differed radically. This is particularly true for
those appellate courts that attach significance to the number of schemes,
transactions, or episodes. In Brandt v. Schal Associates, Inc.,413 for example,
the Seventh Circuit refused to find a pattern where there was only one
scheme.414 Continuity was not demonstrated because the scheme would end
once the perpetrators achieved their objective.41 5 The proposed statute does
not contain such inherent ambiguity. Under the facts of Brandt, the defend-
ants, the prosecutor, and the court would be able to determine, with a
greater degree of certainty, that the alleged conduct violated RICO. Assum-
ing Mr. Brandt's allegations were true, at least two members of Schal Asso-
ciates, as well as personnel at Northwestern University, participated in the




413. 854 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1988) (suit by successor of construction subcontractor under
RICO for concealment of design flaws, threatened termination of the contract, and fraudulent
filing of expense assessments against subcontractor).
414. Id at 952. Although the Seventh Circuit no longer considers "scheme" among its list
of factors, the facts of the Brandt case provide a convenient vehicle for illustrating the clarity
of the amended statute when compared to analyses which rely on "schemes."
415. Id. at 953. As Justice Brennan noted in H.J. Inc., "'scheme' is hardly a self-defining
term. A 'scheme' is in the eye of the beholder, since whether a scheme exists depends on the
level of generality at which criminal activity is viewed." H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 241 n.3 (1989).
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the scam involved several fraudulent backcharges made against the plaintiff/
subcontractor during the construction project. Finally, although the opinion
does not detail the defendants' individual responsibilities in the operation, it
is likely that each played some specialized role.
In addition to providing a clearer standard than those founded on
schemes, transactions, or episodes, the proposed statute avoids the weighing
problem of multi-factor tests. In Saporito, for example, the Third Circuit
supposedly applied the six factors of its pattern test.416 Saporito involved
four individuals, in addition to the defendant corporation, who perpetrated a
fraud on thirty-two victims over several months.4" 7 The court omitted any
consideration of the character of the acts, however, and added its own gloss
to one factor. The court inferred that there was a distinction between pas-
sive and active perpetrators.418 By requiring that plaintiffs and prosecutors
meet all three conditions for "structural racketeering activity," the weighing
problem would be remedied. The first two requirements are met because
more than one person was involved, and the fraud covered several months.
As in Brandt, the Saporito decision does not describe the operation in
enough detail to determine how each of the defendants participated. Never-
theless, because each defendant was an officer in the corporation, they proba-
bly had particular roles.
This proposed statute would be equally definitive where a large, but tem-
porally restricted, operation was present. In the civil hypothetical, a single
defendant used the mails to distribute several hundred fraudulent offers to
purchase distributorships. Although he employed the mechanisms of his
corporation, he did not conspire with other officers or employees. Assuming
he mailed the letters at virtually the same time, all three requisite factors
would be lacking. There were no multiple defendants, there was no role
specialization, and the criminal acts were simultaneous. Although the out-
come would be different from that in many of the cases discussed above, the
determination would be clear for the defendant, the prosecutor, and the
court.
VI. CONCLUSION
RICO attacks organized crime by combining strict penalty provisions and
broad prohibitions on racketeering activity. The term "pattern" is funda-
mental to this enforcement scheme because a pattern of racketeering must be
proved under both the civil and criminal sections of the statute. Yet, "pat-
416. Saporito v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 843 F.2d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 1988).
417. Id
418. Id at 667 n.17.
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tern" never has been clearly defined. While the term means multiple acts of
racketeering within a ten-year period, it has been interpreted to require
"something beyond" this minimum. Federal courts, however, have dis-
agreed vehemently in their understanding of this requirement, even though
the Supreme Court has twice attempted to provide guidance.
Given the severe penalties of RICO, such disagreement indicates that the
statute may be unconstitutionally vague. Where federal judges cannot un-
derstand a criminal provision, there is a great danger that potential defend-
ants and prosecutors will not understand it either. Because of this threat to
due process, Congress should restructure RICO. The statute has become far
too important to dismantle entirely, but the slippery concept of a pattern
must be removed. Due process demands greater specificity in criminal stat-
utes than "something beyond."
